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Paying for What You Get—Restitution Recovery for
Breach of Contract
By Jean Fleming Powers*
I. INTRODUCTION
Many contracts casebooks, in dealing with contract
remedies, include the case Sullivan v. O’Connor,1 a case dealing
with an unsuccessful nose job.2 While a case about the results
of surgery at first blush seems more fitting for a torts book,
Sullivan, like its iconic counterpart Hawkins v. McGee3 uses a
vivid fact pattern in an atypical contracts case4 to illustrate
important points about contract remedies.5 Sullivan has the
added benefit of providing a launching point for a discussion of
the three contracts measures of recovery: expectation, reliance,
and restitution.6 If the approach of the Restatement (Third) of
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment7 [hereinafter referred to as
“the Restatement of Restitution,” or just “the Restatement”]
Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law Houston; J.D., University of
Houston Law Center, 1978; B.A. University of Texas at Austin, 1970. The
author gratefully acknowledges the insightful comments of Professors John
Bauman, Randall Kelso, and Val Ricks, South Texas College of Law Houston,
and the research assistance of Jeeho Shin, South Texas College of Law
Houston, class of 2014.
1. 296 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. 1973).
2. Id. at 184.
3. 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929). Hawkins, sometimes referred to as the “hairy
hand” case, see, e.g., Daniel P. O’Gorman, Expectation Damages, the Objective
Theory of Contracts, and the “Hairy Hand” Case: A Proposed Modification to
the Effect of Two Classical Contract Law Axioms in Cases Involving
Contractual Misunderstandings, 99 KY. L.J. 327, 327-28 (2011), deals with an
unfortunate outcome from skin grafts. Id.
4. The plaintiff in Sullivan did, in fact, allege negligence, Sullivan, 296
N.E.2d at 184, but the jury found for the defendant on that count. Id.
5. Id. at 186-89.
6. See Eric G. Anderson, The Restoration Interest and Damages for
Breach of Contract, 53 MD. L. REV. 1, 8 (1994) (“Conventional contract theory
sets out three alternative remedial interests on which a court may base
damages for breach: the expectation, reliance, and restitution interests.”)
(footnote omitted).
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (AM.
LAW INST. 2011).
*
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gains general acceptance, this could all be changing. The
Restatement, could, if followed in contracts cases, rewrite
contracts casebooks and change the approach to measuring
contracts damages.
Published seventy-four years after the first Restatement of
Restitution,8 the Third Restatement provides a welcomed
updated treatment of this important area of law.9 The promise
of the Restatement is to provide clarification, explanation, and
indeed, respect, for the law of restitution and unjust
enrichment.10 According to many commentators, it has achieved
that goal.11 Yet in dealing with restitution as a recovery for
breach of contract, it falls short. Rather than creating a
framework for analyzing the restitution recovery for a nonbreaching contract party, it, at least for most situations,
eliminates the recovery. It retains a recovery for restitution that
accompanies rescission and adds a disgorgement of profits
recovery for what it calls opportunistic breach. It otherwise
prohibits a recovery for unjust enrichment, “replacing” the
restitution recovery with a new damage recovery for breach of
contract.
The approach creates at least three important problems.
First, it needlessly, and sometimes harmfully, discards the
possibility of a recovery in unjust enrichment for many nonbreaching parties to a contract.12 The Restatement unduly
8. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION (AM. LAW INST. 1937). “A
Restatement (Second) was started and abandoned in the 1980s.” DOUGLAS
LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES & MATERIALS 492 (concise ed.
4th ed. 2012).
9. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Restoring Restitution to the Canon, 110
MICH. L. REV. 929, 929 (2012) (“The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment brings clarity and light to an area of law long shrouded in
fogs that linger from an earlier era of the legal system. It makes an important
body of law once again accessible to lawyers and judges. This new Restatement
should be on every litigator’s bookshelf . . . .”).
10. Id.; See also Lance Liebman, Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, 1 (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“[T]his project
[the Restatement] has been pursued according to the best ALI procedures and
is now a finished work that is as high in quality and as valuable as the very
best Restatements constructed in our 88 years.”).
11. Laycock, supra note 9.
12. The disapproval of unjust enrichment in this context is discussed
generally in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, introductory note 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). The note
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focuses on ensuring that the non-breaching party suffers the
consequences of an ill-fated bargain,13 and eschews a basic
analysis of whether the breaching party has been unjustly
enriched at the expense of the non-breaching party. Second, the
new, but limited, recovery for opportunistic breach14 runs the
risk of both over-compensation and under-compensation, either
denying a deserved recovery for a plaintiff that does not meet
the strict requirements for the exception, or requiring a
breaching defendant to disgorge all profits even though the
amount exceeds the plaintiff’s loss. The punitive nature of the
provision is inconsistent with contract theory generally, and
comes dangerously close to rekindling the failed experiment
with the tort of bad faith breach of contract.15 Third, the changes
the Restatement makes are not only unnecessary, but can be
detrimental. Established contract law and restitution law are
adequate to address most of the concerns expressed, and provide
sufficient flexibility to accommodate any needed adjustments. A
better approach would be to explain how those principles apply
in the context of remedies for breach of contract.
The
Restatement approach blurs, not brightens, the lines between
damages and restitution.
This article begins with a brief discussion of restitution as a
remedy for breach of contract under the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts.16 It then discusses the changes the Restatement of
Restitution adopts and the reasons for the changes. Next, it
discusses why the changes have not only failed to achieve the
goal of clarifying the “prevailing confusion” related to restitution
expresses the view that “performance of a valid and enforceable contract
cannot result in the unjust enrichment of either party.” Id. (citing RESTATMENT
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2(2), §44, cmt. a_(AM. LAW
INST. 2011)). The contention that this approach is harmful is discussed
throughout this article.
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 38
cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“[A]llowing damages measured by the value of
performance unlimited by the contract price, permits the injured party to
reallocate or revalue risks that it is the function of contract to price and to
assign. Such an outcome is contrary to fundamental objectives of contract law
and inconsistent with the other remedies for breach of contract . . . .”).
14. Id. § 39.
15. See infra Part V.B.2.
16. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
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and breach of contract,17 but have at times created more
confusion. It then explains that contract and restitution
principles are not only not in tension relative to restitution for
breach of contract, but in fact support such a recovery.
II. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
APPROACH
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts posits that remedies
for breach of contract
serve to protect one or more of the following
interests of a promisee: . . . his “expectation
interest,” which is his interest in having the
benefit of his bargain . . . his “reliance interest,”
which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss
caused by reliance on the contract . . . or . . . his
“restitution interest,” which is his interest in
having restored to him any benefit that he has
conferred on the other party.18
The three interests in turn result in three different potential
kinds of relief.19 Normally a court will enforce “the broken
promise by protecting the expectation that the injured party had
when he made the contract,” but it may “recognize a claim based
on his reliance rather than on his expectation,” or, “in some
situations . . . grant relief to prevent unjust enrichment.”20
Thus, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts recognizes both
three kinds of relief and three purposes of relief. The distinction
is an important one. Maintaining appropriate focus on purpose
aids in understanding the importance of retaining a restitution
remedy for breach of contract.
In presenting the three interests, the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts prominently cites Fuller and Perdue’s esteemed
17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT pt. II,
ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 1.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a)-(c) (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
19. Id. § 344 cmt. a.
20. Id.
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article, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages.21 In the
article, the authors delineate the three purposes of contract
damages: the protection of the restitution interest, the reliance
interest, and the expectation interest.22 They assert that in
justice, restitution “presents the strongest case for relief” among
the three, noting that the support for restitution is especially
strong where there is a two-unit disparity.23 For example, if my
bank mistakenly puts $1000 in my account, I have a $1000
undeserved gain and the bank has a corresponding $1000 loss.
The disparity between myself and the bank is $2000. The twounit disparity will often occur in a contract recovery situation.24
For example, if the plaintiff is granted restitution for the value
of the services performed for the defendant, the value that the
defendant received is the same as the value the plaintiff gave.
Yet in spite of the strong policy reasons supporting
restitution, expectation damages are generally the preferred
measure.25 In the Restatement (Second), the three interests are
part of a hierarchy in which, for the usual case, each succeeding
interest is smaller than, and likely included in,26 the preceding
one.27 Because larger recoveries are preferred by plaintiffs,
21. Id. at reporter’s note (citing L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The
Reliance Interest in Contracts Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936)).
22. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 21, at 53-54.
23. Id. at 56. (“The ‘restitution interest,’ involving a combination of unjust
impoverishment with unjust gain, presents the strongest case for relief.”)
24. See id. at 54-55. Cf id. at 55 (“[F]or our purposes the most workable
classification is one which presupposes in the restitution interest a correlation
of promisor’s gain and promisee’s loss.”).
25. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in
Contracts Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 57 (1936) (“[T]he normal rule of contract
recovery [is] that which measures damages by the value of the promised
performance.”).
26. See Aaron R. Petty, The Reliance Interest in Restitution, 32 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 365, 374 (2008) (“Fuller & Perdue suggested that the restitution interest
was merely a subset of the reliance interest, where, in addition to reliance by
the promisee, there is also a resultant gain to the promisor.”).
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
[T]he court may recognize a claim based on his reliance
rather than on his expectation . . . . Although [the reliance
interest] may be equal to the expectation interest, it is
ordinarily smaller because it does not include the injured
party’s lost profit. In some situations a court will recognize
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normally the restitution interest would come into play only when
the agreement is not enforceable28 or when “it will give a larger
recovery than will enforcement based on either the expectation
or reliance interest.”29 The sequence would go something like
this: The party who has a cause of action for breach of contract
is normally entitled to the benefit of the bargain, provided by the
expectation measure.30 If, however, he for some reason cannot
prove his lost expectation, or expectation is for some other
reason inadequate, he should be entitled to recover his
expenditures made in reliance on the contract.31 If he further is
unable to recover some or all of those expenditures (for example,
because he would have lost money on the contract), he should at
least be able to recover any net benefit currently held by the
breaching party at his expense.32 The last recovery described is
of course restitution based on unjust enrichment. The comments
make clear both that the restitution interest of a non-breaching
party will apply only in those “rare instances” in which “it will
give a larger recovery than will enforcement based on either the
expectation or reliance interest”33 and that the recovery in those
instances is based on the unjust enrichment of the breaching
party.34 It is true that the cases in which there is a need for a
restitution option in this contracts context may be few. But
justice is not reserved for those whose situations are commonly
yet a third interest and grant relief to prevent unjust
enrichment . . . . Although [the restitution interest] may be
equal to the expectation or reliance interest, it is ordinarily
smaller because it includes neither the injured party’s lost
profit nor that part of his expenditures in reliance that
resulted in no benefit to the other party.
Id.
28. Id. § 344 cmt. d.
29. Id.
30. Id. § 347, cmt. a. (“Contract damages are ordinarily based on the
injured party’s expectation interest and are intended to give him the benefit of
his bargain . . . .”).
31. Id. § 344, cmts. a, c.
32. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 cmts. a, d (AM. LAW
INST. 1981).
33. Id. § 344 cmt. d).
34. Id. (Restitution applies “in connection with contracts . . . when a
party, instead of seeking to enforce an agreement, claims relief on the ground
that the other party has been unjustly enriched as a result of some benefit
conferred under the agreement.”).
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replicated.35 The preference for expectation damages should not
obscure the strong policy reasons for granting a recovery in
restitution in an appropriate case.
III. THE RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION RESPONSE
A. Restitution and Contract
In the chapter dealing with Restitution and Contract, the
Restatement of Restitution first addresses “Restitution to a
Performing Party with no Claim on the Contract.”36 Because
there is no contract claim in the situations covered—
unenforceable or illegal contracts, cases of incapacity, mistake,
or “supervening change of circumstances,” performance of a
“disputed obligation,” or recovery by a breaching party37—it
recognizes a right to restitution for unjust enrichment. Under a
separate topic it deals with “alternative remedies” for a nonbreaching party, generally rejecting restitution based on unjust
enrichment—the most universally accepted justification for
restitution38—for a non-breaching party.39 It criticizes the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts for “indicating that the
purpose of rescission [restitution] for breach was to prevent
unjust enrichment.”40 It labels as “error” use of the “word
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1
cmt. a. (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“The attempt to make the list comprehensive
cannot make it exclusive: cases may arise that fall outside every pattern of
unjust enrichment except the rule of the present section.”).
36. Id. pt. II, ch. 4, topic 1.
37. Id.
38. Id. § 1 cmt. a (“Liability in restitution derives from the receipt of a
benefit whose retention without payment would result in the unjust
enrichment of the defendant at the expense of the claimant.”).
39. See id. at pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 1. (“The attempt to
assimilate . . . traditional contract remedies to a liability based on unjust
enrichment . . . is abandoned here.”). See also id. at pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2,
introductory note 2 (“This restatement rejects the view that the principal forms
of what is sometimes called ‘restitution for breach’ have any necessary relation
to the unjust enrichment of the defendant.”).
40. Id. at pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note, reporter’s note. The drafters
criticize the Restatement of Contracts’ use of restitution to prevent unjust
enrichment. The drafters use the word rescission, indicating that the
Contracts Restatement uses “the word ‘restitution’ as its name for rescission.”
Id. The section cited by the drafters uses the word restitution. RESTATEMENT
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‘restitution’ to describe both (i) a rescission and (ii) an action for
damages measured by the value of the plaintiff’s performance.”41
It characterizes the choice between expectation damages and
restitution as an “imaginary election of remedies produced by
the hypothesis that unjust enrichment had something to do with
it.”42 This article suggests that the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts got it right, and that unjust enrichment does have
something to do with it.
A general description of the Restatement of Restitution
approach is set out herein. However, as the focus of the article
is on the denial of unjust enrichment to the non-breaching party,
the discussion of sections 37 (Rescission for Material Breach)
and 39 (Profit from Opportunistic Breach) will be limited to
providing context for the unjust enrichment emphasis.
B. Rescission and Restitution
Section 37 relates to the limited situations where rescission
for breach is appropriate.43 The Restatement deals with
rescission based on fraud, mistake, and other avoidance issues
in another section unrelated to breach, preserving a restitution
However, it
possibility in each of those situations.44
characterizes the “restitution” option when the contract is
rescinded because of material breach45 as a claim “independent
of the defendant’s unjust enrichment,”46 conceding that its
rejection of unjust enrichment raises questions about whether
either section 37 or section 38 “belong in the present
Restatement at all.”47 It nonetheless includes them for the
“practical” reason that the “remedies are in urgent need of
clarification, and that readers will look for these rules” in the
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 345 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT pt. II,
ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note, reporter’s note (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
42. Id.
43. Id. § 37.
44. Id. at pt II, ch. 4, topic 1.
45. Id. § 37. The Restatement mischaracterizes the concept of material
breach, as discussed later. See infra Part IV.D.1.
46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT pt. II,
ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note, reporter’s note (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
47. Id.
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Restatement.48 It indicates a preference for using the term
rescission instead of restitution.49 Nonetheless, it ultimately
generally adopts “rescission and restitution,”50 a term that
appears, to this author, to be more apt.51
The section has two important limitations that underscore
its rejection of unjust enrichment. First, the remedy “is not
available against a defendant whose defaulted obligation is
exclusively an obligation to pay money.”52 The limitation is
justified partly by its simplicity,53 and partly by a concern that
“allowing the credit seller to seek rescission instead of
enforcement of the debt would alter the terms of the underlying
transaction in the plaintiff’s favor,”54 which would be
inconsistent with the Restatement’s insistence that the plaintiff
must suffer the consequences of its bad bargain.55 Second, the
remedy is not available unless “the further requirements of
section 54 can be met.”56 Section 54 deals generally with the
requirements for rescission and restitution in situations where
the contract is avoided, but includes an “overlapping” reference
The Restatement
to rescission for breach of contract.57
48. Id.
49. Id. § 37, cmt. a (“This section describes an alternative remedy for
breach of contract that is sometimes called ‘restitution’ but is more easily
recognized under the name ‘rescission.’”).
50. See id. § 54; See also id. at pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 1.
51. The rescission and the restitution are distinct. Rescission is the
“unmaking of a contract for a legally sufficient reason,” or an “agreement by
contracting parties to discharge all remaining duties of performance and
terminate the contract.” Recission, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
Regarding the “unmaking” of the contract, the definition continues: “Rescission
is generally available as a remedy or defense for a non-defaulting party and is
accompanied by restitution of any partial performance, thus restoring the
parties to their precontractual positions.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus,
rescission is the undoing of the contract; restitution is the restoration of the
benefits. If the contract is entirely executory, there can be a rescission without
any restitution or restoration.
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 37(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
53. Id. § 37 cmt. a.
54. Id.
55. See infra Part V.B.1.
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 37(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
57. Id. § 54(4)(b) cmt. e (“The topic reappears at this point–despite the
resulting overlap . . . .”).
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emphasizes the distinction between rescission accompanying
fraud, for example, which involves unjust enrichment, and
rescission for breach, which the Restatement contends does
not.58 The Restatement again cites a concern for “remedial
economy,” along with a “concern with fairness to the injured
party.”59 Yet, as will be discussed more fully, the concern for
ensuring that the plaintiff suffers from his bad bargain is not a
feature of contract law, and denying a restitution recovery often
does not produce fairness to the injured party.
C. The Damages Response
Surprisingly, the drafters of the Restatement of Restitution,
in dealing with restitution in the contract context, undertook to
change the Restatement (Second) of Contracts approach to
recovery for breach.60 More surprisingly, they chose to make
changes related to damages,61 rather than just to restitution.
The stated purpose of the changes is to “provide a simplified and
rationalized explanation of some straightforward contract
remedies that have become needlessly difficult to describe.”62
While it is true that the concept of restitution recovery for breach
is not without problems,63 such an undertaking would seem
more appropriate in a Contracts Restatement. Further, the
approach taken, while providing some helpful insights and
suggestions regarding the measure of contract damages, falls
short of its stated goal of providing a simpler and more rational
explanation of contract remedies, and fails to address important
58. Id. § 54(4)(b) cmt. e.
59. Id.
60. See id. at pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 3 (“[T]his Restatement
reverts to the doctrinal position of the first Restatement of Contracts.”)
(emphasis added).
61. See id. at pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 1 (“The claims described in
§§ 37-38 are alternative remedies for breach of contract, available to plaintiffs
who find them more advantageous than expectation damages or specific
performance. Neither depends on a showing of unjust enrichment.”).
62. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 38 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
63. See generally id. pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note, reporter’s note
(describing the historical development of a “restitution” remedy for breach of
contract, and the concerns about whether a non-breaching party should be
allowed a recovery “off the contract” at all).
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considerations related to restitution in a contracts context.
The section generally rejects an unjust enrichment option
for one whose contract was breached by the other party,64
providing instead for performance-based damages, which, while
preserving a focus on the value of the benefit conferred,65 is not
restitution at all. It changes the traditional contracts approach
to recovery for breach (allowing recovery for expectation,
reliance, or restitution) by setting out two damage alternatives:
expectation and performance-based damages.
The latter
includes what is essentially the reliance measure, along with a
new measure that is somewhat similar to restitution. The
relevant section reads as follows:
(1) As an alternative to damages based on the
expectation interest (Restatement Second,
Contracts § 347), a plaintiff who is entitled to a
remedy for material breach or repudiation may
recover damages measured by the cost or value of
the plaintiff’s performance.
(2) Performance-based damages are measured by
(a) uncompensated expenditures made in
reasonable reliance on the contract, including
expenditures made in preparation for
performance or in performance, less any loss
the defendant can prove with reasonable
certainty the plaintiff would have suffered
had
the
contract
been
performed
(Restatement Second, Contracts § 349); or
(b) the market value of the plaintiff’s
uncompensated contractual performance, not
exceeding the price of such performance as
determined by reference to the parties’
agreement.
(3) A plaintiff whose damages are measured by the
rules of subsection (2) may also recover for any
other loss, including incidental or consequential
64. See id. at pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 2 (“[E]nrichment derived
from a valid consensual exchange is neither unjust nor unjustified.”).
65. Id. § 38(2)(b).

11
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loss, caused by the breach.66
Thus, the Restatement takes what was once considered
restitution and recognizes it as an alternative damage
measure.67 In making the changes, it seeks to correct perceived
shortcomings in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
approach.68 It rejects a recovery for unjust enrichment that
exceeds the contract price.69 For a negative contract expectancy,
it uses legal presumptions that provide a “partial recovery,”
albeit not “a complete escape from an unfavorable
bargain . . . .”70 Thus the recovery option created under the
Restatement can be a beneficial recovery option for some
plaintiffs. Nonetheless, it is a damages option, not restitution.
An examination of the section, in the context of a couple of
the illustrations, sheds light on what the section does and does
not do. Illustration 9 to Section 38 compares recovery under the
section to recovery under the expectation measure in a profitable
contract.
A promises B to construct 5000 feet of gravel road
at a price of $12 per running foot, payable on
completion. After 2000 feet of road has been built,
A is wrongfully discharged without payment. A’s
cost of performance is a uniform $10 per foot, so
his expectation damages would be $30,000
($60,000 total price less $30,000 saved cost to
complete). A offers to prove that the value of the
work done so far, measured on a quantum meruit

66. Id. § 38.
67. Id. § 38(2)(b).
68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT pt. II,
ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 1 (“The most important purpose of this Restatement’s
treatment of restitution and contract is to clear up the prevailing confusion.”).
69. Id. § 38(2)(b). As discussed later, the rejection of a recovery exceeding
the contract price is consistent with a recovery for unjust enrichment. See infra
Part IV.A.2.
70. Id. § 38 cmt. a (applying a rebuttable presumption that the “plaintiff’s
earnings from performance would have been at least sufficient to defray the
plaintiff’s reliance expenditures; alternatively, that the plaintiff’s unknown
expectancy would have been at least equal to the market value of the plaintiff’s
performance”).
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basis, is $16 per foot; A seeks damages in the
amount of $32,000. The rule of § 38(2)(b) allows A
to recover damages measured by the value of his
performance (alias quantum meruit), but it caps
such recovery at the contract rate. Because A’s
performance-based damages cannot exceed the
contract rate of $24,000, A will elect to recover
expectation damages of $30,000.71
The calculations illustrate the limits on reliance-based
damages, and the preference for expectation in a profitable
contract.72 The reliance measure, which would not include the
$10,000 profit, yields damages of just $20,000. While the
hypothetical suggests a possible higher restitution recovery (the
$32,000 claimed in the illustration), a restitution claim under
these facts is not supported by the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts73 or the common law of contract.74 In fact, the
illustration is included not to demonstrate a real-world
scenario,75 but to provide context for the illustration that

71. Id. § 38 cmt. b, illus. 9.
72. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts also recognizes the general
superiority of the expectation measure. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 373 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“An injured party who has
performed in part will usually prefer to seek damages based on his expectation
interest (§ 347) instead of a sum of money based on his restitution interest
because such damages include his net profit and will give him a larger
recovery.”).
73. The Restatement discusses restitution in the context of losing
contracts, id., and makes clear that the recovery is uncommon. Id. § 344 cmt.
d (“These rare instances [of parties to a losing contract seeking restitution] are
dealt with in § 373.”). Further, assuming the example is a divisible contract,
the Restatement rejects a restitution recovery for divisible contracts. Id. § 373
cmt. c (“If one party has fully performed his side of [a divisible part of a
contract] and all that remains on the other side is for the other party to pay a
definite sum of money, recovery for the performance rendered is limited to that
sum. Restitution is not available as an alternative . . . .”).
74. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.20, at 823-27 (4th ed.
2004) (emphasizing that generally “damages should be based on the injured
party’s lost expectation[,]” but explaining that in a losing contract restitution
may be the appropriate remedy).
75. While most of the illustrations in the Restatements are based on
cases, “Illustration 9 is strictly hypothetical, representing a claim that is
seemingly never asserted.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 38, reporter’s note c (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
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follows.76 The more enlightening illustration is Illustration 10.
Same facts as Illustration 9, except that B proves
that A’s cost of construction is $14 per foot, with
the result that A is performing at a loss. This fact
does not bar recovery, but A’s damages under
§ 38(2)(b) may not exceed the contract rate for the
work performed. A recovers $24,000, though on
the facts supposed his contractual expectancy
from full performance (or from any partial
performance) is negative.
In other words,
damages measured by the value of A’s unpaid
partial performance are not reduced by the loss A
would have incurred in completing performance.77
Under these facts, the expectation measure of damages would be
$18,000 ($60,000 contract price less $42,000 costs saved). The
reliance measure, preserved in the Restatement of Restitution
as one of the options under performance-based damages, is the
same. While $28,000 was spent in reliance on the contract,
reliance damages preserve the entire loss bargained for by the
plaintiff.78 Thus the $10,000 loss (A would have spent $70,000
to make $60,000), which was not caused by reliance on the
contract, but was bargained for in creating the contract in the
first instance,79 is subtracted.80
Moving to the next potential recovery, the approaches of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Restatement of
Restitution diverge. The Restatement of Restitution, like the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, recognizes that, while the
reliance measure is conceptually defensible, and sufficiently
compensatory in some situations, it can at times fall short.81 It
76. Id. (According to the drafters, the significance of Illustration 9 “in the
present context lies in its juxtaposition with Illustration 10,” which deals with
a losing contract.).
77. Id. illus. 10.
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
79. Cf. id. § 349 cmt. a (explaining that “recovery for expenditures . . .
may not exceed the full contract price”).
80. Id. § 349.
81. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 38 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (noting that a “recovery based on cost,” like
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seeks to remedy this shortcoming, not by allowing a recovery in
restitution as the Restatement (Second) of Contracts does,82 but
by adding the new market value measure.83 Under this
measure, rather than saddling the non-breaching party with the
entire bargained-for loss, it takes a proportional approach.84
Granted, the proportional nature of the approach is not entirely
clear from the text of the section: It describes the measure as
“the market value of the plaintiff’s uncompensated contractual
performance, not exceeding the price of such performance as
determined by reference to the parties’ agreement.”85 The
comments shed light on the meaning, explaining that the
“recovery based on value will be limited to the contract rate for
the performance in question – when such a rate may be
determined – even if this is insufficient to allow the plaintiff to
recoup the cost of performance.”86 The contract rate, when it can
be calculated, would distribute the loss proportionally.
Thus, in a “losing” contract, the recovery of a party that
would have been paid 75% of the value of full contract
performance will be limited to 75% of the market value of the
benefit conferred. In the illustration, for example, the contractor
was to be paid at the rate of $12 per foot for work worth $16 per
foot, or 75% of the market value.87 The market value for the
2000 feet completed by the breaching party is the $32,000
suggested in the previous illustration,88 which is consistent with
reliance “will be reduced (or eliminated altogether) if the defendant can prove
that the plaintiff would have suffered a loss had the contract been performed”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“In
the case of a contract on which he would have sustained a loss instead of having
made a profit, however, his restitution interest may give him a larger recovery
than damages on either [expectation or reliance].”).
82. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST.
1981) (“Occasionally a party chooses the restitution interest even though the
contract is enforceable because it will give a larger recovery than will
enforcement based on either the expectation or reliance interest.”).
83. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 38(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
84. The new measure limits recovery to the “contract rate,” rather than
subtracting the entire loss. See id. § 38 cmt b.
85. Id.
86. Id. § 38 cmt. b (emphasis added).
87. See id. § 38 cmt. c, illus. 11 (using a percentage calculation to
calculate the recovery at the contract rate).
88. Id. § 38 cmt. c, illus. 9.

15

POWERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

516

5/8/18 10:33 PM

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 38.2

Restatement (Second) of Contracts approach.89 Under the
Restatement of Restitution, he would recover 75% of that
amount, or $24,000 (the same result reached by multiplying the
contract rate of $12 per foot by the 2000 feet completed). The
importance of the potential difference depends on the size of the
contract, and the extent of the miscalculation of the cost of
performance. Yet the section does much more than distribute
the loss proportionately. It unapologetically creates a damage
measure rather than a restitution measure.90
Yet, as long as this new damage measure, which deducts not
the entire loss, but only the part attributable to the partial
performance, creates an additional arrow in the quiver of a nonbreaching plaintiff, it can be beneficial. The concern herein is
not the inclusion of the section, but the removal of legitimate
restitution claims. If all that the Restatement did was provide
a third option for measuring damages—a third way to view and
calculate the harm caused by the breach—the approach could be
a useful alternative calculation, albeit an odd inclusion in a
Restatement of Restitution. But it should not foreclose a
recovery for unjust enrichment. Unfortunately, it does just that
by intentionally91 omitting a recovery that may be needed to
satisfy the purpose behind the recovery for unjust enrichment.
D. Restitution for Opportunistic Breach
At the other end of the spectrum, the Restatement includes
a restitution option in section 39.92 The section deals with
opportunistic breach of contract,93
providing a kind of
89. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373 cmt. d, illus. 10 (AM.
LAW INST. 1981). But see supra note 72 (indicating that if the contract is found
to be divisible, the recovery would not be in restitution but would be $24,000
under divisibility).
90. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 38 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). The title of the section is “Performance-Based
Damages.” The provision for recovery of consequential damages further
underscores the damages classification. Id. § 38(3) (“A plaintiff whose
damages are measured by the rules of subsection (2) may also recover for any
other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the breach.”).
91. See supra note 39.
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39
(AM. LAW INST. 2011).
93. Id.
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“restitution plus” designed to provide for disgorgement of profits
in situations where deterrence is the goal.94 The section provides
for disgorgement of profits from a profitable breach under
limited circumstances. Specifically,
(1) If a deliberate breach of contract results in
profit to the defaulting promisor and the
available damage remedy affords inadequate
protection to the promisee’s contractual
entitlement, the promisee has a claim to
restitution of the profit realized by the
promisor as a result of the breach. Restitution
by the rule of this section is an alternative to
a remedy in damages.
(2) A case in which damages afford inadequate
protection to the promisee’s contractual
entitlement is ordinarily one in which
damages will not permit the promisee to
acquire a full equivalent to the promised
performance in a substitute transaction.
(3) Breach of contract is profitable when it results
in gains to the defendant (net of potential
liability in damages) greater than the
defendant would have realized from
performance of the contract. Profits from
breach include saved expenditure and
consequential gains that the defendant would
not have realized but for the breach, as
measured by the rules that apply in other
cases of disgorgement (§ 51(5)).95
The comments emphasize that the section applies only in
“exceptional cases”96 dealing with “restitution for benefits
wrongfully obtained.”97 So limited, the approach has initial
94. See id. § 39 cmt. b (“Restitution (through the disgorgement remedy)
seeks to . . . [reduce] the likelihood that the conscious disregard of another’s
entitlement can be more advantageous than its negotiated acquisition.”).
95. Id. § 39.
96. Id. § 39 cmt. a.
97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39
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appeal and evokes established restitution principles.98 However,
in the contract context in which it appears, especially as coupled
with a broad rejection of unjust enrichment for a non-breaching
party, it becomes problematic.
E. The Justification for the Restatement Changes
The Restatement of Restitution states that the “most
important purpose of this Restatement’s treatment of restitution
and contract is to clear up the prevailing confusion.”99 It “rejects
the view that . . . ‘restitution for breach’ ha[s] any necessary
relation to the unjust enrichment of the defendant.”100 It
expands on the latter point by stating that “performance of a
valid and enforceable contract cannot result in the unjust
enrichment of either party.”101 Thus the overarching goal of the
changes seems to be two-fold: to clarify the law, and to reject,
for most cases, the possibility of restitution for unjust
enrichment for a non-breaching party. The latter goal seems to
be based on the perceived incompatibility between contract law
and restitution principles in relation to breach of contract
remedies.102 In the next section I will examine the extent to
which the Restatement has met the goal of clarifying the law and
the extent to which it has not. In the following section, I will
explain why restitution as a remedy for a non-breaching party is
compatible with both restitution and contract principles, and
why it can be the preferred remedy.

cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
98. Cf. id. § 54.
99. Id. pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 1.
100. Id.
101. Id. at note 2.
102. Id.
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IV. CLARIFYING, OR CREATING MORE CONFUSION?
A. Clarifying the Remedy
1. Rescission and Restitution
By treating separately restitution that accompanies
rescission, and by emphasizing the distinction between it and
unjust enrichment, the Restatement provides some promised
clarity.103
There is good reason to retain restitution in
connection with rescission in response to breach of contract.
Restitution can provide the plaintiff with a simpler and more
favorable recovery.104 It is also useful to draw a distinction
between restitution accompanying rescission and that based on
unjust enrichment. Confusion between the two terms can result
in parties improperly designating their claims105 and in courts
applying flawed analyses.106 Distinguishing the concepts more
accurately describes the remedies sought and granted.
Rescission is an unwinding of a transaction, not an
enforcement of the transaction. Undoing the transaction
necessarily requires restoring the parties to their pre-contract
position.107 Unjust enrichment can be a useful analysis for
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 37
(AM. LAW INST. 2011).
104. Id. § 37 cmt. a (“The plaintiff entitled to a remedy for material
breach or repudiation potentially chooses between damages, specific
performance, and rescission, electing the remedy that promises the most
favorable recovery at the lowest cost.”).
105. Cf. Worcester Heritage Soc’y v. Trussell, 577 N.E.2d 1009, 1010
(Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (“There is ample authority for refusing rescission where
there has been only a breach of contract rather than an utter failure of
consideration or a repudiation by the party in breach.”).
106. See Anderson, supra note 6, at 20 (Courts may “treat[] rescission and
restitution as a linked pair, suggesting that the invocation of the latter as a
measure of damages necessarily brings the former into play. It is widely
recognized, however, that in the context of remedies for breach of contract,
references to ‘rescission’ are unnecessary and confusing . . . . [W]hen one party
seeks relief on account of the other’s breach, the word ‘rescission’ is
misleading.”).
107. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 37
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“Rescission under § 37 looks backward as well,
offering to restore the parties to the status quo ante by unwinding the
contractual exchange instead of pressing it forward.”).
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accomplishing that restoration.108 But the focus is properly more
on restoration than on preventing unjust enrichment.109
Restitution accompanying rescission is not so much an
independent recovery as a concomitant to rescission. While
ideally, once the transaction has been unwound, neither party
will be unjustly enriched, that is because such a result would
indicate an ineffective unwinding of the transaction. The focus
is not so much on the injustice of the retention of the benefit as
it is on the logical steps necessary to restore the prior position
and the context in which the rescission occurred.110
The previously discussed case of Sullivan v. O’Connor111
illustrates the difference between the two analyses. Although
the court disapproved the restitution measure in Sullivan,112 it
recognized it as one of the options available to a plaintiff113—an
option based in unjust enrichment,114 not on a return to the
status quo ante. The court stated that the restitution measure
would be “restoration of the benefit conferred on the defendant
(the fee paid).”115 Such restoration would prevent unjust
enrichment of the doctor by preventing him from retaining a
payment for a service inadequately performed, which would be
unjust for him to retain at the plaintiff’s expense. The recovery
108. DAN B. DOBBS, 1 DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.3(6), at 617
(Practitioner Treatise Series, 2d ed. 1993). (“[O]nce rescission is granted it is
easy to see why restitution must follow. If the defendant has received
performance under a contract that is to be undone by rescission, he is unjustly
enriched unless he is made to restore that performance or its value.”).
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 37
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“Rescission ostensibly requires each party to
return to the other whatever has been received by way of performance . . . .”).
110. Compare id. § 54(4)(a) (“If the claimant seeks to reverse a transfer
induced by fraud or other conscious wrongdoing, the limitation . . . is liberally
construed in favor of the claimant.”) with id. § 54(4)(b) (“If the claimant seeks
rescission instead of damages as a remedy for material breach of contract
(§ 37), the limitation . . . is employed to prevent injustice to the defendant from
the reversal of a valid and enforceable exchange.”).
111. 296 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. 1973).
112. Id. at 187 (“For breach of the patient-physician agreements under
consideration, a recovery limited to restitution seems plainly too meager . . . .”)
113. Id. at 186 (Plaintiff may recover, “presumably, at the plaintiff’s
election, ‘restitution’ damages, an amount corresponding to any benefit
conferred by the plaintiff upon the defendant in the performance of the contract
disrupted by the defendant’s breach.”).
114. See id.
115. Id.
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in no way returns the plaintiff to her pre-contract position.116 In
other words, the restitution recovery is firmly grounded in
unjust enrichment, which is conceptually distinct from
restitution accompanying rescission. Yet the need to clarify the
remedies does not justify discarding restitution for unjust
enrichment as a remedy in other scenarios. The two are not
mutually exclusive. Where a “rescission and restitution” remedy
is not appropriate, all of the remedies for breach, including
restitution for unjust enrichment, should be available.
2. Recovery in Excess of the Contract Price
The Restatement of Restitution also clarifies the recovery
where the value of the benefit conferred exceeds the contract
price, rejecting a recovery in excess of the bargained price. The
provision is well-founded. Under restitution principles, the
proposition that one who receives a benefit and pays the agreed
amount is not unjustly enriched seems unassailable.117 The
Restatements of both Contracts and of Restitution
unquestionably agree by adopting a rule denying restitution to
a party who has fully performed his obligations under the
contract.118 In such situations, the performing party is entitled

116. Sadly, plaintiff’s nose, which the doctor was to improve, after the
surgery “had a concave line to about the midpoint, at which it became bulbous;
viewed frontally, the nose from bridge to midpoint ws [sic] flattened and
broadened, and the two sides of the tip had lost symmetry. This configuration
evidently could not be improved by further surgery.” Sullivan v. O’Connor, 296
N.E.2d 183, 185 (Mass. 1973).
117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“Considerations of both justice and efficiency
require that private transfers be made pursuant to contract whenever
reasonably possible, and that the parties’ own definition of their respective
obligations – assuming the validity of their agreement by all pertinent tests –
take precedence over the obligations that the law would impose in the absence
of agreement.”).
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(“The injured party has no right to restitution if he has performed all of his
duties under the contract and no performance by the other party remains due
other than payment of a definite sum of money for that performance.”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 38(2)(b) (AM.
LAW INST. 2011) (limiting “performance-based damages” to the “price of such
performance as determined by reference to the parties’ agreement”).
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to the contract return.119 Yet there is authority for the
proposition that a party who has not fully performed, but who
has conferred a benefit greater than the contract price, will
recover the greater amount.120 The result seems incongruous to
some, including the drafters of the Restatement of Restitution.121
It makes no sense, so the argument goes, to allow a party who
has fallen short of full performance to recover more than the
contract price for his incomplete performance. The concern
seems to go to the heart of the Restatement changes,122 but it is
not without a solution consistent with both restitution and
contract theory. The simple solution is to adopt a rule that a
non-breaching party cannot recover, in restitution, an amount
exceeding the agreed contract price, which is precisely what the
Restatement has done.123
The question then is whether this simple solution is the
right one. It is certainly not without controversy, and not
universally accepted by courts and commentators.124 Yet, after
careful consideration of the various arguments, this author is
persuaded by the limitation in the context of an agreed contract
119. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 38(2)(b); (AM. LAW INST. 2011) RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373(2)
(AM. LAW INST. 1981).
120. Boomer v. Muir, 24 P.2d 570, 577 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933) (“To hold that
payments under the contract may limit recovery where the contract is
afterwards rescinded through the defendant’s fault seems to us to involve a
confusion of thought.”). Cf., United States v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 479 F.2d
638, 641 (4th Cir. 1973) (“The measure of recovery for quantum meruit is the
reasonable value of the performance . . . . [R]ecovery is undiminished by any
loss which would have been incurred by complete performance.”). While the
court in Algernon Blair focused on not reducing the recovery by the losses, id.,
logically the undiminished recovery might exceed the contract price.
121. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
122. See id. § 38, cmt. d (“[A]llowing damages measured by the value of
performance unlimited by the contract price, permits the injured party to
reallocate or revalue risks that it is the function of contract to price and to
assign. Such an outcome is contrary to fundamental objectives of contract law
and inconsistent with the other remedies for breach of contract . . . .
[P]erformance of a valid and enforceable contract does not result in the unjust
enrichment of the recipient.”).
123. Id. (“[S]ome authorities allow a recovery ‘off the contract,’ unlimited
by the contract price; but this Restatement rejects that outcome.”).
124. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 74, § 12.20, at 828-29 (“Although
authority can be found that the contract price is an upper limit on recovery in
such a case, there is also support for the contrary view.”) (footnotes omitted).
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price.125 The rule can be explained in much the same way that
the well-accepted rule disallowing restitution to the party who
has fully performed is explained: Having committed to perform
for an agreed price, it is not unjust to receive the agreed price for
the agreed performance.126 That being the case, it cannot
possibly be unjust to receive the agreed price for less than the
agreed performance.127 It would be a windfall to the nonbreaching party to receive more than the contract price, thus the
enrichment is not unjust. The famous, and often criticized,128
case of Boomer v. Muir129 that condoned a recovery exceeding the
price130 misses the mark in its reasoning in this regard. The
court reasoned that the contract, which was rightfully
“rescinded through the defendant’s fault[,] . . . ceases to exist for
all purposes.”131 Yet the support for limiting restitution to the
full contract price does not spring from a commitment to
enforcing the contract. The limitation simply considers the
context in which the performance was rendered132 in
determining the extent to which the benefit conferred
constitutes unjust enrichment.
In addition to the logical inconsistency of a rule allowing a
party who has partially performed to receive more than he would
have had he fully performed, such a rule could also negatively
125. See infra text accompanying notes 237-38 regarding the reasons the
limitation does not work when the limitation relates to “value” rather than
price.
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.
1981) (“Since [the party who has fully performed] is entitled to recover the price
in full together with interest, he has a remedy that protects his expectation
interest by giving him the very thing that he was promised. Even if he asserts
that the benefit he conferred on the other party exceeds the price fixed by the
contract, justice does not require that he have the right to recover this larger
sum in restitution.”).
127. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bovee, 574 P.2d 513, 514 (Colo. App. 1978) (“Had
Johnson fully performed, his recovery would be limited to the contract price . . .
. It is illogical to allow him to recover the full cost of his services when, if he
completed the house, he would be limited to the contract price plus the agreed
upon extras.”).
128. Mark P. Gergen, Restitution as a Bridge over Troubled Contractual
Waters, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 711 (2002) (“Boomer has attracted a fair
amount of attention from scholars, much of it critical of the decision.”).
129. 24 P.2d 570 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933).
130. Id. at 577.
131. Id.
132. See generally infra text accompanying notes 345-58.
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impact the performance of the contract. It could open the door
to manipulation as full performance looms, potentially tempting
the party who would benefit from removing the recovery
“ceiling” to precipitate a breach by the other party or otherwise
try to end the contract short of substantial performance.133
Rules of contract enforcement should not be crafted in a way that
undermines the stability of contracts. Finally, the parties have
already provided us with a valuation of the upper limit of
compensation, and therefore the court should not substitute its
valuation for that of the parties.
Besides making it clear that a claimant may not recover
more than the agreed contract price as compensation for a
partial performance of the contract, the Restatement further
explains why, in some situations, the total recovery may in fact
exceed the contract price. A contractor may be due more money
than the contract price, for example, because he did extra work
at the request of the other party. In that case, extra money may
be due based on additional agreements made, or on a restitution
claim outside the confines of the original contract.134 These
recoveries are consistent with, and anticipated by, the
Restatement approach.135 Further, it is axiomatic that a
legitimate damage recovery can exceed the contract price.136
133. The Contracts Restatement recognizes such a possibility, pointing
out that “[s]ince a contract that is a losing one for the injured party is often an
advantageous one for the party in breach, the possibility should not be
overlooked that the breach was provoked by the injured party in order to avoid
having to perform.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373 cmt. d (AM.
LAW INST. 1981). Similarly, if the party has some legitimate insecurity
regarding return performance, he might make a demand for assurances,
hoping to be in a position legitimately to cancel the contract, again receiving a
much better recovery. See id. § 251. While this latter possibility does not have
the same “bad faith” overtones as the former, it nonetheless appears to be a
manipulation that is at best an unintended consequence of the relevant law.
134. The reasoning would not be that the contract performance was worth
more than the agreed amount, but that the party provided services not
contemplated by the contract, for which he should be compensated in
restitution.
135. Regarding the recovery of damages, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 38, cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (While
§ 38 “prohibits a recovery in excess of the contract price for the work done, . . .
plaintiffs may obtain the same compensation if they can prove the necessary
elements of special damages.”).
136. Sullivan v. O’Connor, referenced at the beginning of this article,
would be a case in point. The plaintiff paid $622.65 for the doctor’s fee and
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Damages may exceed the contract price, for example, because
the breaching party has caused compensable consequential
damages.137 In any given case, one of the above suggested
reasons for the award may provide a more appropriate and
coherent justification than does restitution. The Restatement of
Restitution appropriately points out the flawed analyses and
suggests better approaches. Yet any misunderstanding and
misapplication of a legitimate remedy, such as restitution,
should not foreclose legitimate applications of the remedy.
B. Redundant Recovery
1. Performance-Based Damages
The performance-based damage calculation will often
mirror the damage calculation under existing contract and
restitution principles. An example of a contract damage
principle that reaches the same result as the Restatement of
Restitution is seen in Illustration 9 to section 38, previously
discussed.138 In the illustration, A had agreed to construct a
gravel road for an agreed price of $12 per foot.139 For a breach
after A completes 2000 feet, performance-based damages under
the Restatement would be $24,000.140 However, the same result
could be reached using the well-established contract doctrine of
divisibility.141 No new damage measure is necessary to reach the
hospital expenses. Sullivan v. O’Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 185 (Mass. 1973).
The court, however, upheld a damage award of $13,500 representing the harm
to the plaintiff due to the worsened condition of her nose and the various costs,
including pain and suffering for her third operation. Id. at 184, 189.
137. Cf., Gergen, supra note 128, at 712 (“In a fair number of cases in
which a plaintiff elects restitution on breach to recover costs in excess of the
contract price, the cost overruns are attributable to the defendant’s breach of
contract.”).
138. Supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 38, cmt. c, illus. 9 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
140. Id.
141. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 240 (AM. LAW INST.
1981) (“If the performances to be exchanged . . . can be apportioned into
corresponding pairs of part performances so that the parts of each pair are
properly regarded as agreed equivalents, a party’s performance of his part . . .
has the same effect . . . as it would have if only that pair of performances had
been promised.”). Here, two thousand feet at $12 per foot would come out to
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result.142
Illustration 6 to section 38 likewise describes a situation
where a contract restitution recovery and the Restatement of
Restitution approach produce the same result. The illustration
provides:
Driller undertakes to drill a well at a given spot
on Farmer’s land at a price of $5 per foot, payable
on completion, with no charge if water is not
found.
The prevailing price of well-drilling
without such a guarantee is $3 per foot. The cost
of drilling a well varies between 50 cents and $10
per foot, depending on the conditions encountered.
After Driller reaches 500 feet without finding
water, Farmer wrongfully repudiates the contract
and orders Driller off the job. Driller’s contractual
expectancy is unknowable: the court cannot
determine whether water would eventually have
been found at all, nor at what depth, nor at what
cost. Driller has a claim against Farmer for
damages of $1500 by the rule of § 38(2)(b).143
The suggested recovery is of course reached by multiplying the
market value for the work done ($3 per foot) by the 500 feet
drilled by Driller at the behest of Farmer.144 This is also
precisely how the restitution recovery would be calculated under
contract law.145
$24,000. If the contract is found to be divisible, restitution would not be
available. See supra note 72.
142. The shortcomings of the approach when the contract is not divisible
are discussed infra text accompanying notes 223-30.
143. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 38
cmt. b, illus. 6 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
144. Because Farmer cannot prove that the contract would be a losing
contract, no proportionate deduction is required.
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.
1981) (“The reasonable value to the party from whom restitution is sought . . .
is . . . usually greater than the addition to his wealth . . . . If this is so, a party
seeking restitution for part performance is commonly allowed the more
generous measure of reasonable value . . . .”). The measure to which the
comment refers is “the reasonable value to the other party of what he received
in terms of what it would have cost him to obtain it from a person in the
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Further, restitution analysis works even for a court that
prefers a proportional approach to recovery in a losing contract
situation. If the court were to consider the overall price for
which the plaintiff agreed to perform in measuring the extent to
which the benefit conferred is unjust, it may well reach a result
similar to the one suggested by the Restatement. Restitution
would thus work for such cases. However, maintaining a focus
on unjust enrichment would increase the likelihood that a court
will provide greater compensation when the circumstances
indicate it would be unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit
without paying for it.146 Restitution provides the flexibility to
consider not only the valuations in the contract but also such
factors as the extent the breaching party has “taken advantage
of the injured party’s part performance” and “the observance by
the parties of standards of good faith and fair dealing during any
negotiations leading up to the rupture of contractual
relations.”147 This flexibility makes restitution the superior
analytical framework.
2. Opportunistic Breach
Section 39, dealing with opportunistic breach, also often
reaches a result that could easily be reached under existing
contract and restitution principles. Illustration 5 provides an
example of the adequacy of contract damage principles.148 The
illustration involves a strip-mining contract between a
landowner and mining company, under which the company is to
pay royalties to the landowner and to restore the land once the
mining is completed.149 The illustration “combines the facts of
claimant’s position . . . .” Id. §371(a).
146. See infra Part IV.C.4.
147. Id. § 373 cmt. d.
148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39
cmt. d, illus. 5 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
149. The entire illustration is as follows:
Landowner and Mining Company enter a contract for stripmining. The agreement authorizes Mining Company to
remove coal from Blackacre in exchange for payment of a
specific royalty per ton. A further provision of the agreement,
included at Landowner’s insistence, obliges Mining Company
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Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. . . . with the
results”150 in two other well-known cases dealing with the same
issue.151 The issue in the three cases is whether to award
damages for failure to restore property by using the diminution
in value measure or the cost to complete. The court in
Peevyhouse chose diminution in value,152 while the courts in the
other two cases chose cost to complete.153 The concern in these
cases, and others like it, is whether the cost to complete measure
will involve economic waste or a windfall to the plaintiff, or,
conversely, whether diminution in value will result in undercompensation.154 Thus, in Groves v. John Wunder Co.,155 one of
the cases reaching the Restatement result, the court found the
appropriate measure to be the cost to complete the
performance.156 It is worth noting that, along with concerns
to restore the surface of Blackacre to its preexisting contours
on the completion of mining operations. Mining Company
removes the coal from Blackacre, pays the stipulated royalty,
and repudiates its obligation to restore the land. In
Landowner’s action against Mining Company it is
established that the cost of restoration would be $25,000, and
that the diminution in the value of Blackacre is the
restoration is not performed would be negligible. The
contract is not affected by mistake or impracticability. The
cost of restoration is in line with what Mining Company
presumably anticipated, and the available comparisons
suggest that Mining Company took this cost into account in
calculating the contractual royalty. Landowner is entitled to
recover $25,000 from Mining Company by the rule of this
section. It is not a condition to Landowner’s recovery in
restitution that the money be used to restore Blackacre.
Id.
150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 39, reporter’s note d (Am. Law Inst. 2011) (referencing Peevyhouse v.
Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962).
151. The two other cases are Groves v. John Wunder Co., 286 N.W. 235
(Minn. 1939) and Am. Standard, Inc. v. Schectman, 439 N.Y.S.2d 529 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1981).
152. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 114 (Okla.
1962).
153. Groves, 286 N.W. at 238; Am. Standard, Inc., 439 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
154. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 74, § 12.13.
155. Groves, 286 N.W. 235 at 238-39.
156. Id. at 238 (“[D]efendants here are liable to plaintiff for the
reasonable cost of doing what defendants promised to do and have wilfully
declined to do.”). Cost to complete was also awarded in the other case providing
the result in the illustration, making the result apparently consistent with the
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already mentioned, courts also often consider the willfulness of
the breach in choosing the appropriate measure.157 Thus, the
concern for “opportunism” in section 39 is already addressed in
the damage analysis. Further, the “disgorgement” of profits
under section 39 is unnecessary in this context. The “profit”
retained by the breaching party, in a case of refusing to complete
the work contracted for, is in the nature of a saved expense.158
Yet logically, the amount saved by not completing the work is
the same as the cost to complete the work. There is no additional
profit to disgorge.
Further, while it may be true that section 39 would change
the result under the Peevyhouse facts, the section is not needed
to change the result. Garland Coal’s breach may have been
opportunistic, but the same result can be reached under damage
principles. There is significant disapproval of the result in
Peevyhouse.159 As the illustration suggests, the cost to complete
was $25,000, while the diminution in value was negligible
($300).160 The court chose diminution in value, partly based on
illustration and with Groves. Am. Standard Inc., 439 N.Y.S.2d at 534.
157. H.P. Droher & Sons v. Toushin, 85 N.W.2d 273, 280 (Minn. 1957).
It would seem that the better rule and the one followed by a
majority of the courts is that, where there is a substantial
good-faith effort to perform the contract, but there are defects
of such a nature that the contract has not been performed
according to its terms, which defects can be remedied without
the destruction of a substantial part of the building, the
owner is entitled to recover the cost of making the work
conform to the contract but, where it appears that the cost of
remedying the defects is grossly disproportionate to the
benefits to be derived therefrom, the owner is entitled to
recover the difference between the value of the property as it
would have been if the contract had been performed
according to its terms and the value in its condition as
constructed.
Id.

158. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 39(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“Profits from breach include saved
expenditure . . . .”).
159. See, e.g., Gerald Caplan, Legal Autopsies: Assessing the Performance
of Judges and Lawyers Through the Window of Leading Contract Cases, 73.1
ALB. L. REV. 1, 36 (2009) (“Peevyhouse has become one of a handful of contracts
cases that ignites readers’ sense of injustice.”).
160. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39
cmt. d, illus. 5 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). In Peevyhouse, diminution in value was
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a finding that reclamation of the land was “incidental” to the
contract.161 Yet the facts clearly indicate that the provision was
important and was specifically bargained for by the
landowners.162 Thus the problem in Peevyhouse was likely
created by a misapplication of contract principles,163 and could
be corrected by proper application of those principles. A new
rule of law is not needed.
The redundancy with restitution principles is more complex
and requires greater analysis. Of course, to the extent that the
section is difficult to apply, it fails to clarify the law. At this
point, the focus will be on the extent to which the section is
redundant. In that regard, the congruence with restitution
principles appears deliberate. The Restatement itself concedes
that, at its core, the claim in this section is “an instance of
restitution for benefits wrongfully obtained[,] . . . identical in
principle to the claims described in Chapter 5 . . . (authorizing a
disgorgement remedy in cases of profitable torts and equitable
wrongs), and it is properly understood and delimited by analogy
to those claims.”164 It further indicates that the section logically
could have been included in Chapter five,165 but is in Chapter
four “in order to group together, for clarity of exposition, the
divergent themes of restitution in a contractual context.”166 In
other words, restitution principles provide, at the core, the basis
for the results. An example illustrates the adequacy of
restitution principles. Illustration 8 provides:
Landlord leases Blackacre to Tenant at an annual
rent of $100,000. The lease provides that Tenant
shall not sublet the property without Landlord’s
$300. Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d at 114.
161. Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d. at 114.
162. Id. at 115 (Irwin, J., dissenting) (“Defendant admitted in the trial of
the action, that plaintiffs insisted that the above provisions be included in the
contract and that they would not agree to the coal mining lease unless the
above provisions were included.”).
163. See generally Caplan, supra note 159, at 36-39 (discussing several
legal and tactical mistakes that may have led to the unfortunate result).
164. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
165. Id.
166. Id.
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prior consent. Tenant sublets Blackacre for one
year at an annual rent of $110,000. Landlord
learns of this transaction after the sublease has
expired and commences an action in restitution.
Landlord is entitled to recover $10,000 from
Tenant by the rule of this section. It is not a
condition of recovery that Landlord prove
damages as a result of Tenant’s breach.167
The restitution recovery fits. The property belongs to
Landlord. Tenant has no authority or permission to lease it to
another person. Tenant has wrongfully taken from Landlord the
right to either withhold consent, to condition consent on
receiving any excess rent, or to negotiate for an early
termination of Tenant’s lease so that he can contract directly
with any prospective tenant at a potentially higher rate. The
proper focus is more on the wrongful appropriation of Landlord’s
property right than the breach of contract. Any gains from that
wrongful use rightfully belong to Landlord. No finding of
opportunism is required. Maintaining a focus on restitution is
more instructive in reaching the right result. Introducing a
redundant contract “rule” detracts from, rather than adds to, the
analysis.
C. Clarification that Misses the Mark
1. The Nature of the Remedy
There is no doubt that the restitution measure of recovery
for breach of contract is the subject of considerable confusion.168
Conceptually, the idea of “restitution damages” seems a bit
curious. Restitution and damages are different things, and serve
different functions. The focus of restitution is on unjust
enrichment; the focus of damages is on failed expectation and
harm. The Restatement “clarifies” this confusion by rejecting a

167. Id. § 39 cmt. d, illus. 8.
168. Andrew Kull, Rescission and Restitution, 61 BUS. LAW. 569, 569
(2006) (“The relation between restitution and contract is notoriously
confused.”).
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restitution option and embracing a damage remedy.169 The
problem, however, is more in the confusion about the two
concepts than in any mutual exclusivity of the two as potential
remedies. For example, if I enter into a contract to buy goods,
and the seller fails to deliver the goods, I am entitled to the
return of any down payment I may have made.170 The return of
the down payment prevents both economic harm and unjust
enrichment.171 If all I really want is the return of my down
payment, it makes little difference whether I am seeking
damages or restitution.
On the other hand, if the amount of damages and of
restitution diverge, it makes a difference. If I prefer restitution,
am I seeking restitution as an alternative measure of damages,
or as an alternative method of recovery? The tendency to treat
the recovery as the former is likely the source of much of the
confusion. This is not surprising. The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts lists restitution with expectation and reliance
damages as one of the three choices available to the nonbreaching party.172 This placement can create an impression
that restitution is a damage measure rather than a remedy to
prevent unjust enrichment. Further, courts sometimes refer to
The
the restitution measure as restitution damages.173
limitations placed on the measure under contract law further
seem to support a damage measure categorization. For example,
once a party has substantially performed, the contract price
controls the recovery.174 One might conclude that if restitution
were truly based in unjust enrichment, rather than damage
theory, the contract would not be relevant.175 These factors
unfortunately can create an impression that the goal is to
measure harm rather than to measure unjust enrichment.
169. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
170. U.C.C. § 2-711 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
171. The loss of the down payment constitutes harm, and the seller is
unjustly enriched at the expense of the buyer.
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
173. See, e.g., LaSalle Talman Bank, F.S.B. v. United States, 317 F.3d
1363, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373(2) (1981).
175. One would be wrong in such a conclusion, despite its initial appeal.
Supra Part IV.A.2.
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However, none of these observations necessarily leads to a
conclusion that the recovery is not based in unjust enrichment.
A closer look suggests just the opposite.
It is important to note, for example, that while restitution is
one of the “purposes of remedies”176 listed in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, the recovery itself does not appear under
Topic two (“Enforcement by Award of Damages”).177 It rather
appears under Topic four (“Restitution”),178 along with other
restitution recoveries for unjust enrichment,179 clearly
indicating the different basis for the recoveries.
The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts recognizes restitution not as
a way “to enforce an agreement, [but to] claim[] relief on the
ground that the other party has been unjustly enriched as a
result of some benefit conferred under the agreement.”180 Thus,
terms like “restitution damages” reflect more a confusion by the
user of the term than an inconsistency in the underlying theory.
Confusion among lawyers and judges about a concept may be a
good reason to explain the concept in a better way, but it is not
a reason to abandon a legitimate recovery. Further, considering
the impact of the contract is in keeping with the general
approach to unjust enrichment of considering the context in
which the benefit was conferred.181
2. The Winstar distraction
The Restatement of Restitution faults the two Restatements
of Contracts for much of the “confusion surrounding the term
‘restitution’ in a contractual context . . . .”182 In support of its
176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (AM. LAW INST.1981)
(The section refers to “remedies,” not damages.).
177. Id. at ch. 16, topic 2.
178. Id. at ch. 16, topic 4.
179. Id. Including restitution for the breaching party, restitution when
the contract is within the statute of frauds, and restitution when the duty does
arise or is discharged. Id. §§ 374, 375, 377.
180. Id. § 344 cmt. d. See also Anderson, supra note 6, at 15 (explaining
that “courts sometimes speak of a restitutionary recovery as ‘off the contract,’
as opposed to expectation damages ‘on the contract’ . . . .”).
181. See infra Part V.C.
182. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT pt.
II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note, reporter’s note (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
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position, it cites an article,183 Rescission and Restitution,184 that
suggests that “the treatment of ‘restitution and contract’ in the
existing Restatements has been a failure.”185 Several cases cited
in support of the premise—the “Winstar-related cases”186 —
arose out of events with “origins in the savings-and-loan crisis of
the 1980s.”187 Federal regulators faced with the potential for
“massive insolvencies” entered into agreements with “relatively
healthy institutions” to acquire at-risk institutions in exchange
for “favorable accounting and tax treatment” for a period of
twenty-five or thirty years.188 The subsequent adoption of the
Federal Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of
1989 (FIRREA) made these favorable agreements illegal.189 The
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Winstar
Corp.190 held that the United States, in refusing to honor the
now-illegal agreements, was liable for a breach of contract, and
remanded for a determination of “the appropriate measure or
amount of damages . . . .”191 The article, which influenced the
Restatement approach,192 takes exception to the treatment of
restitution and contract in the cases dealing with the remedy.193
There have been many Winstar cases,194 and a thorough analysis
of them could be the subject of an entire article. Yet because of
the importance of the cases in the conception of the Restatement,
a couple of observations are enlightening.

183. Id.
184. Kull, supra note 168.
185. Id. at 573.
186. Id. at 571.
187. Id. at 570.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 570-71 (citing Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989)).
190. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
191. Id. at 910.
192. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 38, reporter’s note a (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“For the second thoughts that
prompted the revision [of § 38], see Kull, Rescission and Restitution, 61 Bus.
Law. 569 (2006), especially at 580-581 n.56 and 586 n.78.”).
193. Kull, supra note 168, at 573.
194. Id. at 571 (“[S]cores of ‘Winstar-related cases’ made their way
through the Court of Federal Claims, with periodic appeals to the Federal
Circuit.”).
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While it is true that some of the cases contain statements
that seem inconsistent and confusing,195 the confusion can be
dispelled without denying recovery in unjust enrichment.
Further, other cases illustrate the continued viability of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts approach. One prominent
case, Glendale Federal Bank v. United States,196 does both.
Glendale arises from facts that follow the pattern just
described.197
After finding for Glendale on the liability
198
question,
the trial court then awarded $909 million to the
plaintiffs.199 The Government appealed and the Federal Circuit
vacated the judgment.200 Both the trial court and the Federal
Circuit disapproved the expectancy measure as being too
speculative.201 The trial court then chose a restitution remedy,
which the Federal Circuit found to be “basically flawed.”202 The
problem with the restitution remedy, as explained by the
Federal Circuit in its earlier holding on damages,203 is that it too
was fatally uncertain.204 The District Court had determined the
amount by which the Government benefitted by calculating the
obligations and risks Glendale accepted when acquiring the
failing bank. However, as the court points out, this amount is
not necessarily the benefit to the Government. It is not clear
that the Government would have, even without the acquisition
by Glendale, been liable for the full amount. For instance, the
Government might have found another bank to acquire the
failing institution, or it might have prevented some of the losses
by instituting better management. Conversely, it might have
incurred more liability after the merger if one or both banks
ultimately failed.205 In other words, the case “presents an
195. See id. at 571-72.
196. 378 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
197. See id. at 1309.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1310.
200. Id.
201. Id. (“[T]he problems of proof suggested that any award premised on
expectancy damages would be too speculative to uphold.”).
202. Glendale Fed. Bank, FSB, v. United States, 378 F.3d at 1308, 1310
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
203. Glendale Federal Bank, FSB v. United States, 239 F.3d 1374 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
204. Id. at 1382.
205. Id.
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illustration of the problem in granting restitution based on an
assumption that the non-breaching party is entitled to the
supposed gains received by the breaching party, when those
gains are both speculative and indeterminate.”206 The court
then decides that the reliance measure is the appropriate
measure under the facts.207 The case ultimately is a good
illustration of why the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
approach works.
Perhaps the District Court would not have erred had it
followed a better contracts analysis. Under the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, expectation is the preferred measure of
damages. However, where expectation is not appropriate, the
plaintiff may recover in reliance. Surprisingly, in Glendale, the
District Court, having rejected expectation, determined that
restitution would be appropriate. It was not until it had chosen
a restitution measure that it then “recognized [a] third category
of damages, known as reliance damages, and added specified
reliance damages to the total award it granted plaintiff.”208 If it
had not been distracted by restitution, but had considered
reliance as the most likely alternative to expectation, as the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts would suggest,209 it would
have at that point calculated damages appropriately. While all
of this confirms the unsuitability of an unjust enrichment
recovery on the facts of the case, and similar cases,210 it is in no
way an indictment of unjust enrichment in contract generally.
The next section provides another example of a Winstar case
that creates confusion that is easily clarified without banning a
restitution recovery.

206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(“As an alternative to the measure of damages stated in § 347, the injured
party has a right to damages based on his reliance interest . . . .”).
210. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit followed the
Glendale reasoning in LaSalle Talman Bank, F.S.B. Glendale Federal Bank,
FSB v. United States, 239 F.3d 1374, 1367-77 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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3. A Common Misconception
One unfortunate reading of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts is that the cost of the performance is an alternative
way to measure restitution, sometimes resulting in courts
confusing reliance and restitution.211 To the extent that the
Restatement of Restitution debunks that notion, this author
heartily concurs. However, the concept, which has admittedly
gained a foothold, may be attributable to a misreading of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. The Contracts Restatement
provides that a non-breaching party may recover in restitution
“for any benefit that he has conferred on the other party by way
of part performance or reliance.”212 Unpacking the sentence, it
unquestionably refers to either a benefit conferred by way of part
performance or a benefit conferred by way of reliance. There can
be no doubt, based on both the syntax and the justification for
the recovery,213 that reliance is not compensable under this
section without a conferred benefit.214 However, some courts
have cited this provision when asserting that relief in restitution
for the non-breaching party includes an alternative measure
based on “the cost of the plaintiff’s performance, which includes
both the value of the benefits provided to the defendant and the
plaintiff’s other costs incurred as a result of its performance
under the contract.”215 The quote is from a Federal Circuit case,
Landmark Land Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,216 one
of the Winstar cases. It is not entirely clear whether the court
misread the restatement provision or Acme Process Equipment

211. See, e.g., id. at 1376 (“When restitution damages are based on
recovery of the expenditures of the non-breaching party in performance of the
contract, the award can be viewed as a form of reliance damages, wherein the
non-breaching party is restored to its pre-contract position by returning as
damages the costs incurred in reliance on the contract.”).
212. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
213. See id. cmt. a (“An injured party . . . may, as an alternative, seek,
through protection of his restitution interest, to prevent the unjust enrichment
of the other party.”).
214. Id. § 370 cmt. a (“Restitution is . . . available to a party only to the
extent that he has conferred a benefit on the other party.”).
215. Landmark Land Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 256 F.3d 1365, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
216. Id.
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Co. v. United States217 (a case it cited in support of the
statement218), or both. The Landmark court quotes Acme
Process: “As the best means of restoring the status quo ante, cost
of performance is often used.”219 But Acme Process itself makes
clear that if cost of performance is used, it is used as a surrogate
for the value of the benefit of the performance,220 not as a
recovery based on out-of-pocket costs.221
Thus, while a
clarification of the Restatement provision is in order, an actual
clarification, not a substantive change, is more appropriate. The
clarification can occur without denying a potentially valuable
remedy.
4. The Proportional Limitation
As indicated, limiting recovery for complete performance to
the contract price is appropriate under both contract and
restitution principles. The parties have agreed on the value of
the performance. Yet in the case of a partial performance, unless
the contract is divisible, we have no such evidence of the parties’
intent regarding valuation. Even as an alternate damage
recovery, the Restatement approach leaves many unanswered
questions. Questions about proportions and values still must be
addressed. Whether the plaintiff recovers for unjust enrichment
or performance-based damages, courts must grapple with
measuring the value of the performance. To suggest that the
parties would have agreed to a proportional allocation of
amounts assumes too much. For example, a contractor who
agrees to install 1000 linear feet of fencing at $X per foot would
not necessarily be willing to install ten linear feet at the same
217. Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509 (Ct. Cl.
1965), rev’d on other grounds, United States v. Acme Process Equip. Co., 385
U.S. 138 (1966).
218. Landmark Land Co., 256 F.3d at 1372.
219. Id. (citing Acme Process Equip. Co., 347 F.2d at 530).
220. Cf. Acme Process Equip. Co., 347 F.2d at 530-31.
221. See id. The Court states that “cost of performance is often used as
the basis for determining the amount of quantum meruit recovery, in the
absence of ‘any challenging evidence.’ . . . But if the defendant is able to show
that the costs incurred by the contractor were excessive (as a result, for
example, of inefficiency or extravagance), the amount of recovery is
commensurately reduced.” Id. (citations omitted).
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price per foot. Thus, to impose such a valuation on the parties
is to impose an obligation to which they have not agreed. The
doctrine of divisibility anticipates such an inappropriate result
and is formulated to avoid imposing such requirements on nonconsenting parties.222
The effort to protect contractual
expectations under that doctrine will be of no avail if the same
result can now be reached through performance-based damage
theory.
The concept of a contract rate may involve someone other
than the parties determining said rate.223 The potential problem
is addressed under the divisibility doctrine by eschewing
divisibility where the rate cannot be determined either by the
terms of the contract,224 or by “considerations of fairness”225
considering the value to “the injured party in terms of his
expectation with respect to the total agreed exchange.”226 The
Restatement of Restitution itself recognizes the possibility that
corresponding pairs of performances may not be agreed
equivalents, and seeks to put it to rest by pointing out that initial
impressions are not always correct. Illustration 12 makes the
point:
A is employed by B for one year at an annual
salary of $30,000, payable monthly. After six
months on the job, A is wrongfully discharged. As
both parties are aware, these first six months
constitute the “hard season” in A’s line of work:
the reasonable value of A’s services during this
period is $3500 a month.
Under such
circumstances, the contract between A and B does
not establish a price for the six months of A’s
222. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 240 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST.
1981) (“[F]airness requires that a party, having received only a fraction of the
performance that he expected under a contract, not be asked to pay an identical
fraction of the price that he originally promised on the expectation of full
performance, unless it appears that the performance that he actually received
is worth to him roughly that same fraction of what full performance would have
been worth to him.”).
223. Cf. id.
224. Id. § 240 cmt. d.
225. Id. § 240 cmt. e.
226. Id.
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interrupted performance.
A is entitled to
performance-based damages of $6000, over and
above the $15,000 in salary that B has already
paid.227
The illustration makes the point that $30,000 annually is
not necessarily the same as $2,500 per month. Had the contract
specified a value of $2500 per month, or $3500 per month for six
months, and then $1500 per month for the remaining six
months, recovery might have been available under the doctrine
of divisibility at the contract rate.228 But if the Restatement
approach is synonymous with divisibility, then it does not add
anything to the analysis. If it goes beyond divisibility (which it
clearly does),229 it risks imposing a limitation on recovery for the
non-breaching party that is more severe than the parties would
have bargained for.
Further, given that the contract did not give us the $3500
per month, where did we get it? According to the Restatement,
it is based on the value of the work done for B,230 which is
precisely the amount to which A would have been entitled under
an unjust enrichment claim. Yet if that is the measure, how
have we simplified anything? We still must measure the value
of that benefit. Further, the reason for a recovery based on the
benefit conferred on the breaching party seems grounded in
unjust enrichment, not damages to A.

227. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 38
cmt. b, illus. 12 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
228. The illustration is slightly confusing, given that the contract seems
to actually contemplate payments of $2500 per month. Presumably the reason
this does not fit a divisibility analysis is that the “corresponding pairs of part
performances” are not “agreed equivalents.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 240 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
229. For example, illustration 11 to section 38 involves a contract to build
a barn, and applies a “ratable portion” analysis. Under a divisibility analysis,
a contract to build a barn would not be divisible due to the intent of the parties
and the lack of contract terms dividing performances and payments as “agreed
equivalents.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 38 cmt. c, illus. 12 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
230. The illustration bases damages on the difference between the
amount A has been paid for the first 6 months ($15,000) and the “reasonable
value of A’s services during this period [of] $3500 a month” (a total of $21,000
for the six months) to arrive at the damage award of $6,000. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/7

40

POWERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

Paying for What You Get

5/8/18 10:33 PM

541

Considering the example in relation to A’s damages, the
example illustrates a solution in search of a problem. A has not
necessarily been harmed vis-à-vis the six months worked. He
has apparently been paid exactly what he was supposed to be
paid under the contract. In fact, an employment contract,
providing for regular payments, would likely be seen as a
divisible contract.231 Under these facts, however, divisibility is
really beside the point. A has been harmed by the fact that he
has been deprived of payment for the remaining six months of
his contract. Given that the contract is a contract for a definite
term, he should, at least at first blush, be entitled to the entire
remainder of his unpaid salary.232 The breaching party would
then be entitled to prove what A could have reasonably made in
similar employment and subtract it from the damage amount by
way of mitigation.233 Even assuming the defendant could meet
his burden of proof,234 however, since the remaining contract
work was worth just $1500 per month, mitigation principles
would unlikely require him to work harder to limit damages.235
Thus, the plaintiff would have been entitled to a minimum of
$6000 in damages (the loss of $1000 per month, after subtracting
$1500 per month he might have earned in mitigation), and
probably more.236
The Restatement solution is at best
redundant.
231. JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 651 (5th ed.
2011) (“[M]onthly employment contracts are said to ‘fit neatly into the usual
definition of a divisible contract.’”).
232. “A wrongfully discharged employee is entitled to the salary that
would have been payable during the remainder of the term . . . .” JOSEPH M.
PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 14.18 (7th ed. 2014) (footnote omitted).
233. The payable salary is “reduced by the income which the employee
has earned, will earn, or could with reasonable diligence earn in similar
employment during the unexpired term.” Id.
234. MURRAY, supra note 231, § 123[D], at 781 (“The burden of proof is on
the employer to prove both the employee’s opportunity to secure comparable
employment and the employee’s failure to mitigate damages.”).
235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §350(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(denying recovery only for losses that could have been “avoided without undue
risk, burden or humiliation.”). Of course, if he could easily earn $2500 per
month without working harder, there is no reason not to limit damages on this
basis.
236. This best-case-scenario mitigation for the defendant assumes he can
prove the plaintiff would have not only found “replacement” employment but
would have been able to start his new job the day after being fired, a likely
insurmountable burden.

41

POWERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

542

5/8/18 10:33 PM

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 38.2

Lastly, to say that the recovery should be limited to a
proportional amount of the valuation the parties agreed on
requires that we know what the parties considered the agreed
contract return. While a contract that specifies a payment
amount for an agreed performance sets the contract price for
that performance, when the return involves something other
than money the court has no valuation by the parties on which it
can rely. Where the contract does not provide the valuation, the
court must supply it, whether awarding restitution or
performance-based damages. The Restatement chooses the
latter237 without providing any greater certainty to the
calculation.238
D. Creating More Confusion
1. The Confusion Surrounding Material and Total
Breach
The Restatement of Restitution disapproves of the term
“total breach,” a term used in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, finding it to be “easily misconstrued.”239 It chooses to
substitute the term “material breach”240 to avoid confusion. The
attempt, however, adds to the confusion, potentially defeating
much of a carefully constructed system of terms and analysis
and creating unnecessary inconsistencies between the two
Restatements. A material breach of contract does not, as the

237. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 38(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
238. Performance-based damages under this section are measured by
“the market value of the plaintiff’s uncompensated contractual
performance . . . .” Id. The same measure might be used in restitution.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
239. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 37
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“[T]he expression ‘total breach’ is easily
misconstrued.”). See also id. § 38 cmt. a (“[T]he expression ‘total breach’ is
frequently misunderstood . . . .”).
240. Id. § 37 cmt. c (“The present Restatement employs the term ‘material
breach’ to designate what both Restatements of Contracts call ‘total breach,’
only because its meaning is more easily understood.”). See also id. § 38 cmt. a
(“[T]his Restatement refers instead to ‘damages for material breach or
repudiation.’”).
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Restatement of Restitution would suggest,241 necessarily result
in a right to cancel the contract and sue for damages. True, a
material breach may be required for cancellation, but it is not
enough in and of itself. The party who would cancel must show
more. The Contracts Restatement sets up a three-part analysis.
Section 241 delineates significant circumstances in determining
whether the breach (or “failure to render or to offer
performance”242) is material.243 Section 242 indicates significant
circumstances in determining whether the “remaining duties
are discharged.”244 Section 243 states that “a breach by nonperformance gives rise to a claim for damages for total breach
only if it discharges the injured party’s remaining duties to
render such performance . . . .”245 Significantly, the section 241
factors for material breach are also included as factors under
section 242, along with other factors related to substitute
arrangements and to the importance of timeliness.246 The
comment further elaborates that a material breach may,
depending on the circumstances,247 be cured.248 It is not until
the requirements of section 242 are met that the contract may
be cancelled. That point, as indicated in section 243, is when
there is a total breach. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
uses the two terms consistently in other provisions, each time
conveying the intended meaning.249 If there is some antipathy
241. Cf. id.
242. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
243. Id.
244. Id. § 242.
245. Id. § 243.
246. Id. § 242.
247. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.
1981) (“This Section states circumstances which are to be considered in
determining whether there is still time to cure a particular failure, or whether
the period of time for discharge has expired.”).
248. Id. § 242 cmt. a (“Ordinarily there is some period of time between
suspension and discharge, and during this period a party may cure his
failure.”).
249. Section 237 provides that, with an exception for divisible contracts,
“it is a condition of each party’s remaining duties to render performances to be
exchanged under an exchange of promises that there be no uncured material
failure by the other party to render any such performance due at an earlier
time.” Id. § 237 (emphasis added). Section 236 provides that a “claim for
damages for total breach is one for damages based on all of the injured party’s
remaining rights to performance.” Id. § 236(1) (emphasis added). In other
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toward the term “total breach” it seems that the better solution
would be to come up with another term that might meet with the
approval of the drafters rather than collapsing the two terms
into one, thereby losing the carefully reasoned distinction.
2. Consequential Damages
Even with the performance-based damage measure,
concerns about inadequate compensation persist. The drafters
implicitly recognize the potential shortcomings and seek to
correct them by making concessions that lack clarity. The
Restatement of Restitution suggests that in granting
performance-based damages, courts should not be stingy with
their awards.250 But what would that mean exactly in a contract
context? Does it mean, for example, that the requirements of
avoidability, foreseeability, and certainty251 are to be relaxed? If
so, are we relaxing these limitations because they are not
legitimate contract damages limitations? If the concepts need
reevaluation, this is surely a rethinking of contract theory that
requires serious evaluation of many factors related to contract
law. If, on the other hand, the relaxation is to be limited to the
traditional “restitution” context because it appears that contract
damages are insufficient, it makes more sense to acknowledge
that and allow a recovery in restitution. The Restatement
almost concedes as much. In explaining the “relaxed” approach
to damages in this context it acknowledges the possible injustice
of denying restitution,252 and seeks to solve it through this
relaxed damage measure, suggesting that “plaintiffs may obtain
the same compensation if they can prove the necessary elements

words, a material breach suspends duties and a total breach ends the contract.
The two concepts are legally distinct.
250. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 38
cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“A jurisdiction that adopts the position of this
Restatement should ensure that evidentiary requirements for proof of special
damages caused by the defendant’s breach are not unduly restrictive.”).
251. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 350-52 (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
252. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 38
cmt. e (“[T]he plaintiff may face formidable difficulties in establishing the fact
and amount of the resulting loss, if proof of damages must be made with
rigorous specificity.”).
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of special damages,” using the suggested relaxed approach.253
One justification given is that the defendant may have “obtained
a performance that was unexpectedly costly to the
plaintiff . . . .”254 In other words, the defendant may have been
unjustly enriched at the plaintiff’s expense. An award based on
unjust enrichment addresses the same concerns in a more
straightforward way.
V. COMPATIBILITY OF CONTRACTS PRINCIPLES AND
RESTITUTION PRINCIPLES
A. The Oil and Water Concern
The Restatement justifies singling out non-breaching
parties as undeserving of restitution255 by citing what it calls the
“fundamental primacy of contract over restitution, and the effect
of valid contractual dispositions in displacing any claim that a
consensual transaction might be productive of unjust
enrichment . . . .”256 Under this approach, a party to a contract
who strives to perform it can never get restitution, while a party
who totally breaches a contract may be entitled to restitution.257
The drafters effectively treat restitution and contract in this
context like oil and water – incapable of combining effectively.
Yet the two are not necessarily inconsistent at all. In fact,
restitution and contract can coexist quite nicely.
Contract damages and restitution serve different purposes
and thus can exist as alternate choices. Neither eclipses the
other. Consider again, for example, the case of Sullivan v.
O’Connor. The plaintiff was unhappy because she was supposed
to recover from surgery with a beautifully improved nose, and
instead found herself with a nose that was much less attractive.
The plaintiff did not get what she paid for. Contract damages
are designed to address that concern. Restitution, however, is
not designed to enforce the bargain of the parties. It is designed
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT pt. II, ch.4, topic 2, intro. note 1 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
256. Id. pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 2.
257. Id. § 36.
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to provide a recovery for a benefit conferred on another person
under circumstances in which it would be unjust to retain the
benefit without paying for it. In other words, the concern with
restitution is with an unjustly enriched party paying for what he
gets.
A claim for restitution, as opposed to restitution as a remedy
for another cause of action,258 is not dependent on a tort, a breach
of contract, or any other separate basis for a claim.259 It is a
cause of action under an independent body of law.260 That is not
to say that other law does not impact the potential for recovery.
If A today has $50 that belonged to B yesterday, he is not
unjustly enriched if B voluntarily gave him the money261 or if B
gave him the money in consideration of his mowing B’s lawn.262
If, however, B gave the money to A by mistake, A is unjustly
enriched at B’s expense. Likewise, if A took the money from B
without B’s consent, A is unjustly enriched because he got the
money based on his own crime or tort.263 In other words,
property law, contract law, tort law, criminal law, or some other
law can inform the analysis about whether the enrichment is
unjust. That does not change the fact that a claim for restitution
exists, and exists as a restitution claim.
Like many other legal concepts, restitution law recognizes
common patterns for which it will apply, and others where it will
not. The last two examples cited ordinarily would support a
restitution claim. But because a restitution claim is an
independent cause of action, and may exist without a breach of
258. See DOBBS, supra note 108, § 4.1(1), at 552 (“Unjust enrichment has
both a substantive and a remedial aspect. The substantive question is whether
the plaintiff has a right at all . . . .”).
259. Id. (noting that the defendant may gain “advantages without tort or
breach of contract”).
260. Id.
261. See id. § 11.10, at 780 (“[O]ne who renders services without
expecting payment for them is not entitled to restitution of that value, since he
intended to, and did make a ‘gift’ of the services.”).
262. Id. § 4.9(2) at 684 (“[R]espect for the contract means that the
plaintiff cannot recover restitution of benefits to which the defendant was
entitled under the contract.”).
263. DAN B. DOBBS, 1 DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.1(1), at 552
(Practitioner Treatise Series, 2d ed. 1993). (“Sometimes unjust enrichment
is . . . obvious . . . : if the defendant steals the plaintiff’s watch, he must restore
it.”).
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duty under some other law, the law must be very chary about
imposing on the recipient an obligation to pay for the benefit.
Thus, the law also recognizes some fairly categorical reasons to
deny restitution. For example, it is universally accepted that
one who makes a gift cannot claim restitution because the
gratuitous intent is inconsistent with a finding that the
enrichment is unjust.264 Likewise, the officious intermeddler
hardly has justice on his side in claiming that the person on
whom he has forced an unwanted benefit should pay for it.265
The prohibition on restitution in these situations is wellfounded266 and the need to establish guidelines well-considered.
But benefits conferred under a valid contract are neither
gratuitous nor officious. The question then becomes whether
there is some similar reason categorically to deny restitution to
a breach of contract claimant. As explained below, I submit that
there is not.
Yet, aside from the limited exceptions of sections 37 and 39,
the Restatement prohibition on restitution seems to be
categorical, but without any convincing justification.
As
previously noted, the categorical rule does not necessarily add
predictability in contract cases.267 Further, allowing an unjust
enrichment claim introduces no insoluble chaos to the analysis.
If restitution is available, restitution principles would then
inform that analysis for the contract context, just as they would
in other restitution contexts, and would allow for more just
results. The overarching justification, therefore, seems to be the
perceived incompatibility between contract and restitution. The
Restatement adopts, admittedly with some limiting
explanation,268 the general rule that “enrichment derived from a
valid consensual exchange is neither unjust nor unjustified.”269
264. Id. § 4.9(1) at 680 (“If there is a black-letter rule for unsolicited
benefits it is that ‘volunteers’ and ‘officious intermeddlers’ cannot recover
restitution.”) (footnotes omitted).
265. See id.
266. But see generally id. § 4.9(1) (discussing the overstatement of the
“black-letter” rule, along with the important principles underlying the rule and
the more nuanced approach taken by courts in its application).
267. See supra Part IV.C.4.
268. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT pt.
II, ch. 4, topic 2, introductory note 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
269. Id.
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However, the rule focuses too heavily on the broad statement
and too little on the admitted overstatement.
The broad statement works for many situations. It is
undoubtedly true that contract terms may negate any unjust
enrichment claim. For example, a party who failed to meet
contractual requirements for a bonus payment would not be
entitled to restitution for benefits conferred in the unsuccessful
attempt.270 The same could be said for many failed conditions in
contracts.271 The most basic example would be any situation
where a performing party, realizing he made a bad bargain,
seeks to simply ignore the contract, and seek recovery by way of
restitution because his performance is worth more than the
earned contract amount.272 It is such cases that give us the
admittedly misleading statement that “‘there can be no unjust
enrichment in contract cases.’”273
The idea that restitution is inconsistent with contract is
firmly planted in the General Principles set out at the beginning
of the Restatement. The basis for restitution described in section
1 (“A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another
is subject to liability in restitution. . . .”)274 is immediately
followed by the Limiting Principles in section 2.275 The second
limiting principle is that a “valid contract defines the obligations
of the parties as to matters within its scope, displacing to that
extent any inquiry into unjust enrichment.”276 Likewise, in the
chapter dealing with Restitution and Contract, the Restatement
expresses a broad principle that the “fundamental primacy of
contract over restitution” is “accurately expressed in more
concrete terms by familiar judicial statements to the effect that
270. Dove v. Rose Acre Farms, 434 N.E.2d 931, 936 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)
(holding that an employee, having “failed to perform all of the conditions of the
contract . . . is not entitled to recover any portion of the bonus.”).
271. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(indicating that non-occurrence of a condition excuses return performance).
272. Illus. 9 to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 38 is such an example. See supra text accompanying notes 7176.
273. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
274. Id. § 1 (referencing Fenerjian v. Nogshim Co., 72 F.Supp.3d 1058,
1085 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
275. Id. § 2.
276. Id. § 2(2).
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‘where there is contract, there can be no unjust enrichment.’”277
Yet it follows that statement with a note of caution, suggesting
that these and “similar shorthand expressions . . . must be
weighed with care, because their implications cannot always be
taken at face value.”278 It further recognizes that “statements to
the effect that ‘there can be no unjust enrichment in contract
cases’ can be misleading if taken casually.”279 The gist of the norestitution argument seems to be that the non-breaching party,
having committed to perform for an agreed return, cannot later
argue the injustice of holding him to the consequences of that
bargain. However, the drafters fail to keep their own counsel in
appropriately recognizing the limits of the general statement.
Justice, being a relative concept, may be better served by
preventing unjust enrichment of the breaching party at the
expense of the non-breaching party.
What, then, is the correct analysis? The Limiting Principles
are a good starting point, as long as the limitations on the
limitation are respected. The point of the limitation is that a
party who has contracted to perform for an agreed price cannot
simply ignore the contract and demand a greater payment.280
However, the statement that a “valid contract defines the
obligations of the parties” is limited by the language “as to
matters within its scope, displacing to that extent any inquiry
into unjust enrichment.”281 The limitation is an important one.
The comments to the general unjust enrichment rule provide
insight into the import of the limiting words. Comment b states
that “[u]njustified enrichment is enrichment that . . . results
from a transaction that the law treats as ineffective to work a
conclusive alteration in ownership rights. Broadly speaking, an
ineffective transaction for these purposes is one that is
nonconsensual.”282 The acceptance of restitution in the context
of failed bargains (excluded from this rule by the requirement of
277. Id. pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 2.
278. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT pt.
II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
279. Id. § 2 cmt. c.
280. Id. (“[T]he parties’ own definition of their respective [valid]
obligations . . . take[s] precedence over the obligations that the law would
impose in the absence of agreement.”).
281. Id. § 2(2) (emphasis added).
282. Id. § 1 cmt. b.
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a “valid contract”) is consistent with this view. However,
restitution for the non-breaching party is also consistent. The
consent to a contract is to the performance by both sides of the
entire agreement. The non-breaching party has never consented
to a different contract, under terms that are now being imposed
by the actions of the breaching party and the court.283
The facts of illustration 4 to section 2 are helpful in
understanding the limitation.
A prepares preliminary designs and cost
estimates for the construction of a bridge
contemplated by City. The parties agree that A
will be compensated for its services only if City
decides to construct the bridge and to award the
contract to A. The project is abandoned. Five
years later City revives the project, using A’s
earlier studies for planning purposes but
awarding the contract to B. A sues City for breach
of contract and unjust enrichment, pointing out
(correctly) that City has enjoyed the benefit of
work for which A was never paid. Yet City’s use
of A’s plans without compensation is in
accordance with the terms of the parties’ valid
agreement. That being so, there is no unjust
enrichment of City and no liability in
restitution.284
The illustration is based on a 1943 Washington case,
Chandler v. Washington Toll Bridge Authority.285 The result in
the case appears to be correct, and consistent with the rule
described. Yet that consistency depends on a very specific
understanding of the agreement. In the case itself, the builder
“agreed, by an independent covenant, that if work on the bridge
was not commenced within the period specified in the contract,
the public should be entitled to the benefit of any of the work
which he should have performed by way of preparation of plans,
283. Again, the comparison with divisible contracts is instructive.
284. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2
cmt. c, illus. 4 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
285. 137 P.2d 97 (Wash. 1943).
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specifications, or similar data.”286
Thus, the case is an apt illustration of the contract
limitation. However, the crucial information is the agreement
that the City is entitled to use the work without compensation,
which is not made clear by the more general language in the
illustration.287 Without this explicit agreement, the illustration
could just as easily exemplify an argument for restitution. If the
parties had not addressed, either explicitly or implicitly, the
ownership of any plans or other data prepared by the builder, it
seems unlikely the court would, as a matter of law, supply such
a term.288 If the contract does not address any use of the work,
it is not “within its scope.”289 Therefore there is no reason to
deny recovery for unjust enrichment.290 Without a categorical
reason to deny, the argument for restitution is compelling. The
benefit to the city and the corresponding detriment to the builder
(assuming no evidence of gratuitous intent) support a restitution
recovery. The omission of the crucial fact in the illustration
underscores the categorical nature of the restriction in the
Restatement, as opposed to a more case-specific analysis of the

286. Id. at 99.
287. To say that A is to “be compensated for its services only if City
decides to construct the bridge and to award the contract to A[,]” RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2 cmt. c illus. 4 (AM. LAW
INST. 2011), is not the same as saying that the City is entitled to use A’s work.
288. See Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 889 (1921)
(“Intention not otherwise revealed may be presumed to hold in contemplation
the reasonable and probable. If something else is in view, it must not be left
to implication.”). In the case, it seems more reasonable and probable that a
builder would not lightly agree to do significant work for another without any
compensation. Cf. Incomm, Inc. v. Thermo-Spa, Inc., 595 A.2d 954 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1991), in which the court refused to imply a condition of subjective
satisfaction to the production of an advertising brochure. The court stated that
such a condition “would subject an artist’s right to compensation for what
might well be hundreds of hours of labor, not to mention whatever talent and
training he happens to possess, to the purchaser’s whim.” Id. at 958. The court
went on to explain that “if the parties wish to write such a condition into their
contract, there is nothing to stop them. But in the absence of such an express
condition . . . a condition of personal satisfaction will not be implied by the
courts.” Id.
289. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 2(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
290. The absence of a provision for compensation under the contract is
not the same as a prohibition against compensation under unjust enrichment,
nor is it a statement about the right to use the plans.
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presence (or absence) of unjust enrichment.291
B. The Underlying Contract Considerations
1. The
Unwarranted
Bargained-for Losses

Concern

for

Preserving

The Restatement of Restitution is overly aggressive in
ensuring the plaintiff is not relieved of the consequences of its
bad bargain, while at times being overly solicitous in protecting
The concern for preserving the
breaching defendants.292
plaintiff’s losses seems unjustified for several reasons. First, the
Restatement approves restitution that accompanies rescission of
the contract,293 which can also relieve the plaintiff of bargainedfor losses.294 That rule is justified partly by the simplicity of the
remedy.295 Yet even where rescission is not feasible, restitution
may be a fairly easy remedy to apply. Where it is not, the
Restatement approach does not necessarily simplify the

291. After citing the Chandler case, the drafters include a discussion of
an English case, Cutter v. Powell (1795) 101 Eng. Rep. 573; 6 Term Rep. 320,
for the proposition that the denial of a recovery based on “the value of his
services, measured not by the conditional contract but by the prevailing wage”
to the estate of a seaman who died before fulfilling the condition of completing
voyage is not consistent with modern law. The drafters stated that a finding
that “the parties intended to contract for a forfeiture in the event of Seaman’s
death during the voyage . . . seems so unlikely, a modern court would
presumably allow restitution of the value of Seaman’s services by the rule of
§ 34.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2,
reporter’s note c (AM. LAW INST. 2011). The case, of course, was in the context
of impracticability, as it was impossible for the seaman, having died, to
complete the contract. Yet the reasoning is entirely consistent with allowing
restitution in the situation of a breach of contract, as was actually the situation
in Chandler.
292. See id. § 38 cmt. d. “By capping the damage calculation at the
contract rate . . . , § 38(2)(b) prevents these plaintiffs as well from electing
performance-based damages as a means of escape from an unfavorable
bargain.” Id.
293. Id. § 37.
294. Id. § 37 cmt. b (“In theory, and sometimes in practice, rescission
pursuant to § 37 permits a plaintiff who has paid in advance for a defaulted
performance to recover an amount exceeding compensatory damages.”).
295. Id. § 37 cmt. a (“So long as it is possible as a practical matter to order
that the plaintiff’s performance be restored in specie, it will usually be easier
to do so than to calculate damages for breach or to compel [performance].”).
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calculation.296 And there is no principled reason to allow or
disallow the non-breaching party to escape the consequences of
a bad bargain solely due to the timing of the defendant’s breach.
Second, contract law does not normally concern itself with
preventing parties from escaping bad bargains. “Rather, it
focuses on overcoming the loss to the aggrieved promisee.”297 If
there is no loss, there is no reason to examine the bargain
further. If A agrees to sell his boat to B at a price that is
ridiculously below market value, and B repudiates the contract,
A can now happily sell his boat to another at the market rate.
He can pocket the benefit he got from the breach without so
much as a “thank you” to B.298 The goal of contract damages is
to compensate, not to make sure the consequences of bad
bargains fall entirely on non-breaching parties.299
Third, there is no justification for treating non-breaching
parties who admittedly made bad bargains worse than other
contracting parties. Yet the Restatement of Restitution, in the
contract context, singles out non-breaching parties for its refusal
to allow a restitution recovery. Parties who made defective
bargains are entitled to restitution.300 Parties to contracts that
become impracticable are entitled to restitution.301 Breaching
parties are entitled to restitution for benefits conferred on nonbreaching parties.302 Restitution should likewise be available to
296. See supra Part IV.C.4.
297. MURRAY, supra note 231, § 118[B], at 752.
298. Under the UCC, an aggrieved seller, after a breach by a buyer, may
choose to resell the goods and receive as damages “the difference between the
resale price and the contract price . . . .” U.C.C. § 2-706(1) (AM. LAW INST. &
UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). Logically, this “difference” represents a harm to the
seller only when the seller must sell for less than the contract price – in other
words, when the seller had a favorable contract. If the seller is able to sell for
more, he is not harmed, and is in fact released from a bad bargain. But the
Uniform Commerical Code (UCC) is quite clear that this seller, even having
made a bad bargain, can keep his resulting gains. Id. § 2-706(6) (“The seller is
not accountable to the buyer for any profit made on any resale.”).
299. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, introductory note,
reporter’s note (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“[T]he principal purpose of the [contract
law] rules relating to breach is to place the injured party in as good a position
as he would have been in had the contract been performed.”).
300. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§§ 31-34 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
301. Id. § 34.
302. Id. § 36; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 374 (AM. LAW INST.
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non-breaching parties.
Fourth, the Restatement allows the defendant to avoid
paying for net benefits received from the other party by hiding
behind the contract it has disavowed or dishonored. It thus, for
this purpose, gives the defendant—the breaching party—the
benefit of the bargain. Yet the benefit of the bargain is a concept
that normally applies to the wronged party, not the breaching
party. If the plaintiff has in fact suffered a loss, and the only
reason he is not entitled to damages (or is entitled only to
inadequate damages) is that he made a bad bargain, why should
he absorb a potentially large part of the loss and leave the
breaching party with an unearned benefit? In other words, why
is it not unjust to allow the defendant to keep benefits he got, at
the plaintiff’s expense, under a contract he will not honor?
2. The Normative Pitfall
The opportunistic breach provision places an inordinate
focus on the injustice of retention of benefits by the breaching
party, bordering on, or in fact becoming, punitive. The
Restatement refers to the breaching party as a “wrongdoer” who
“takes without asking.”303 Yet even with this emphasis, it seeks
to limit the scope of the provision,304 recognizing that breach of
contract “is not usually treated in law as a wrong to the injured
party of a sort comparable to a tort or breach of equitable
duty.”305 The approach stakes out two extreme positions, each
of which is inconsistent with contract law. On the one hand, it
protects the breaching party at the expense of the non-breaching
party, allowing the former to keep gains without payment in
order to ensure that the latter does not escape his bad bargain.306
On the other hand it is overly punitive toward one who breaches
1981).
303. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
304. Id. § 39 cmt. a. “The restitution claim described in this section is
infrequently available . . . .” Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 3(b) (noting that the “practical
result” of the Restatement approach “is to foreclose ‘restitution’ as a means by
which a party bound to perform at a loss can escape the consequences of a
disadvantageous bargain.”).
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out of self-interest.
Fundamentally, contract law is not normative law.307 It is
not concerned with punishing people who breach contracts,308
but maintains a focus on compensation.309 In fact, under
“efficient breach” theory, the law recognizes potential benefits of
a breach of contact.310 While the theory has its detractors,311 it
remains an important part of contract law.312 A rule that allows
disgorgement of profits following a breach of contract is
inconsistent with this focus. The inconsistency is embraced by
the Restatement of Restitution itself, which acknowledges that
the “rationale of the disgorgement liability in restitution, in a
307. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, intro. note (AM. LAW
INST. 1981) (“The traditional goal of the law of contract remedies has not been
compulsion of the promisor to perform his promise but compensation of the
promisee for the loss resulting from breach.”).
308. Id. (“‘Willful’ breaches have not been distinguished from other
breaches, punitive damages have not been awarded for breach of contract, and
specific performance has not been granted where compensation in damages is
an adequate substitute for the injured party.”).
309. For example, the UCC provides that the “remedies provided by [the
Uniform Commercial Code] must be liberally administered to the end that the
aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully
performed . . . .” U.C.C. § 1-305(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977)
(emphasis added). The minimal standard is underscored by the further
provision that “neither consequential or special damages nor penal damages
may be had except as specifically provided in [the Uniform Commercial Code]
or by other rule of law.” Id.
310. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, intro. note (AM. LAW
INST. 1981) (“[A] party may find it advantageous to refuse to perform a contract
if he will still have a net gain after he has fully compensated the injured party
for the resulting loss.”); see generally id., intro. note, reporter’s note.
311. See, e.g., PERILLO, supra note 232, § 14.36.
312. See, e.g., Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., 841 F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir.
1988) (“[If the promisor has] discovered that his performance is worth more to
someone else . . . efficiency is promoted by allowing him to break his promise,
provided he makes good the promisee’s actual losses.”); Thyssen, Inc. v. S.S.
Fortune Star, 777 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985) (“A third explanation [for the rule
generally denying punitive damages for breach of contract], offered by
economists, is the notion that breaches of contract that are in fact efficient and
wealth-enhancing should be encouraged, and that such ‘efficient breaches’
occur when the breaching party will still profit after compensating the other
party for its ‘expectation interest.’”); Allapattah Servs. Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 61
F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1329 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (citing L.L. Cole & Son, Inc. v. Hickman
665 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Ark. 1984) (“Not only are intentional breaches exempt
from punitive claims, they are sometimes encouraged. ‘The law has long
recognized the view that a contracting party has the option to breach a contract
and pay damages if it is more efficient to do so.’”).
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contractual context or any other, is inherently at odds with the
idea of efficient breach in its usual connotation.”313 It is true that
the Restatement takes pains to limit application of the section
to “exceptional cases.”314 Yet the text seems amenable to
expansion. As pointed out by one author, the “provocative
nature of the term [opportunistic], coupled with the power and
bounty of disgorgement, may provide significant temptation to
overutilize section 39.”315
Any such expansion would be reminiscent of the
unfortunate foray into creating a tort of “‘bad faith’ denial of the
existence of a contract.”316 The tort had been “recognized” in a
California case, Seaman’s Direct Buying Services v. Standard
Oil Company of California.317 Even though the court in that case
ultimately reversed the holding on this ground due to “the trial
court’s failure to instruct as to the bad faith requirement[,]”318
the recognition of the cause of action, which included a potential
punitive damage recovery, was roundly criticized.319 The case
was eventually overruled by the California Supreme Court,320
putting an end to the failed experiment.321
Professor Nicholas Johnson discusses the problems
associated with the debunked theory, noting the inability to
contain it within any predictable boundaries.322 He further
313. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39
cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
314. Id. § 39 cmt. a. Caprice L. Roberts, Symposium: Restitutionary
Disgorgement for Opportunistic Breach of Contract and Mitigation of Damages,
42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 131, 144 (2008) (“In the careful drafting of section 39, the
Restatement attempts to ensure narrow application of this restitutionary
disgorgement remedy.”).
315. Roberts, supra note 314, at 145.
316. Nicholas J. Johnson, The Boundaries of Extracompensatory Relief
for Abusive Breach of Contract, 33 CONN. L. REV. 181, 181 (2000).
317. Seaman’s Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 686
P.2d 1158, 1167 (Cal. 1984) (“[A] party to a contract may incur tort remedies
when, in addition to breaching the contract, it seeks to shield itself from
liability by denying, in bad faith and without probable cause, that the contract
exists.”).
318. Id. at 1170.
319. Johnson, supra note 316, at 181.
320. Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 680 (Cal.
1995).
321. Johnson, supra note 316, at 181-82.
322. Id.
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notes that, while there may indeed be reasons to provide
“extracompensatory damages” for some breaches of contract,323
such efforts tend to be unworkable unless confined to
“subcategories that are conceptually and practically severable
from the general pool of transactions,”324 such as abusive breach
in insurance contracts.325
The Restatement provision on
opportunistic breach has no such limitation. Yet as Professor
Johnson points out, “a general standard of abusive breach,”326
creates the same parameters problems seen in Seaman’s.327
More to the point here, he notes the impact such a general rule
would have on all contracts, by raising the risk of liability for
contracting parties generally. As he points out, “saying that we
will award punitive damages [–which the disgorgement
principle effectively does –] for willful, opportunistic or bad faith
breach . . . elevates risk in all transactions.”328 Yet this is
precisely the kind of standard suggested in the Restatement of
Restitution. Having realized the folly of such an approach in the
past, courts should not be eager to create the same problems
under a new name. While there may be situations where
“disgorgement” is appropriate, the justification for such
disgorgement should be grounded in restitution principles329 not
in a misguided desire to punish breaching parties.330

323. See id. at 183.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Nicholas J. Johnson, The Boundaries of Extracompensatory Relief
for Abusive Breach of Contract, 33 CONN. L. REV. 181, 181-82 (2000).
327. Id. at 183.
328. Id.
329. If an unjust enrichment option is preserved, there is no need to
create a new and separate claim. At that point, the question becomes simply
one of measurement of the unjust enrichment.
330. It is important to note the distinction between bad faith breach of
contract, as just described, and the breach of the duty of good faith. The latter
remains a viable theory of liability under contract law and provides protection
from bad faith actions without the need to change existing law. See U.C.C. § 1304 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (“Every contract . . . imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement.”); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Every contract imposes
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement.”).

57

POWERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

558

5/8/18 10:33 PM

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 38.2

3. Obscuring other Considerations
The bright line rules in the opportunistic breach section
tend to obscure not only restitution principles, but also relevant
contract concerns. Consider, for example, illustration 7 to
section 39. In the illustration, City enters into a contract for fire
protection services that “specifies the number of men, horses,
and wagons to be kept in readiness at specified times and places,
and the contract price is negotiated as a function thereof.”331 The
illustration “adopts the facts and reverses the result in City of
The
New Orleans v. Firemen’s Charitable Ass’n . . . .”332
changed Restatement result provides for disgorgement of the
money saved by the Association when it failed to supply the
specified numbers.333
The result in the case itself was based in part on important
contract considerations not carried into the illustration. For
example, the court considered whether the contract was for a
performance, or for a method, finding, contrary to the
illustration’s description, that it was for the former.334 Because
the performance was the basis of the contract,335 and there was
no fault with the performance, there was no claim.336 The fact
that it was performed in a way that saved money for the
defendant was not the issue. Absent mistake or a deficiency in
performance, no recovery was available.337 Another nuance in
331. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39
cmt. d, illus. 7 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
332. Id. § 39 reporter’s note d (citing City of New Orleans v. Fireman’s
Charitable Ass’n, 9 So. 486 (La. 1891)).
333. Id. § 39 cmt. d, illus. 7.
334. Fireman’s Charitable Ass’n, 9 So. at 488 (“The Ordinance required
the contractor to keep up its equipments to a certain standard so as to insure
a faithful performance of the contract . . . . The complaint is to the deficiencies
in the minor parts of the contract, relating to the employment of a certain
number of men and the use of equipments.” (emphasis added)).
335. Granted, the illustration’s description seems to emphasize the
importance of the method, but as presented does not give enough consideration
to the distinction. The approach thus seems more categorical than is
warranted.
336. Fireman’s Charitable Ass’n, 9 So. at 488 (“[W]e are of the opinion
that the main purpose of the contract was faithfully executed.”).
337. City of New Orleans v. Fireman’s Charitable Ass’n, 9 So. 486, 488
(La. 1891) (“There is no averment that the money was paid through error in
law or fact, or that it was delivered on a condition which has not been
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the case that is omitted in the more categorical illustration is a
possible waiver issue. As the court stated, “[d]uring the
execution of the contract the city accepted the fire department
tendered by the association with the alleged deficiencies. The
city, therefore, has no just cause of complaint unless it can show
some damage from the failure of the association to carry out its
contract by reason of the alleged deficiencies.”338 This again is
an important consideration that may get lost in a reflexive
application of the Restatement rule.
Further, if the contract had been for a specific number of
men, as the illustration seems to suggest, we would not need
section 39 to award compensation. Contract principles would
provide the appropriate remedy. Another example shows why
this would be so. If I hire a security guard to provide security
for a party that I host, paying him in advance, and he does not
show up, I am entitled to get my money back because of his
breach of contract. I did not get what I bargained for—a security
guard for my event. The guard cannot defend by saying that
nothing bad happened anyway. I did not get what I paid for, and
I have a claim for breach of contract. In City of New Orleans, the
court found that the City did get what it paid for, even though
the method was not the one contemplated. If on the other hand,
the court had found that the City had contracted for a specific
number of men, and did not get what it paid for, it would be
(absent waiver) entitled to damages to the extent the
performance fell short.339
This last statement highlights another concern with the
Restatement of Restitution approach. The appropriate recovery
for the City if the contract were breached would be damages, not
disgorgement of the money the defendant saved. While it may
be true that the amount the Association saved was the same as
the value the City lost, if there were any differences, contract
damage principles would support compensation based on the
City’s damages rather than the Association’s gain.340 As long as
performed.”).
338. Id.
339. Cf. id. (“The city, therefore, has no just cause of complaint, unless it
can show some damage from the failure of the association to carry out its
contract by reason of the alleged deficiencies.”).
340. Freund v. Washington Square Press, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 419, 422 (N.Y.
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the City is made whole,341 any disgorgement beyond
compensation seems punitive. Any urge to punish the Firemen’s
Charitable Association, even for a clear-eyed choice to reduce
costs, seems inconsistent with both contract342 and equitable
principles.
C. The All-or-Nothing Approach
The choice to deny virtually all unjust enrichment for the
non-breaching party343 results in an all-or-nothing approach to
restitution. Thus, most non-breaching parties would get no
recovery in restitution at all. However, recognizing that there
may be injustice in allowing breaching parties to keep the
benefits conferred by the other party, and being unwilling to let
some enrichments go uncompensated, the drafters chose to give
super-restitution to a limited group of disappointed contracting
parties.344 The result of the approach is that some deserving
claimants get no restitution at all, others get more than they
should, and many important restitution concerns are not
addressed.
Deciding whether an enrichment is unjust, and the extent
to which it is unjust, is at the heart of any restitution analysis.345
Context is key. General restitution principles recognize that
wrongfulness of the gain can impact the recovery.346 However,
1974) (“Damages are not measured, however, by what the defaulting party
saved by the breach, but by the natural and probable consequences of the
breach to the plaintiff.”).
341. The other possibility of course is that City’s damages exceed the
savings by the Association. In such case, providing full compensation to the
City would not likely generate any pushback.
342. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 cmt. a (“[C]ourts in
contract cases do not award damages to punish the party in breach . . . .”). See
also Roberts, supra note 314, at 148-49. (“Unlike tort law, contract law does
not also service the desire to punish – at least not officially.”).
343. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
344. Id. § 39.
345. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“The substantive part of the law of restitution is
concerned with identifying those forms of enrichment that the law treats as
‘unjust’ for purposes of imposing liability.”).
346. Id. § 3 cmt. a. (“Liability to disgorge profits is ordinarily limited to
cases of . . . ‘conscious wrongdoing,’ because the disincentives that are the
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restitution, although sometimes affected by wrongdoing, is not
dependent on wrongdoing. So, for example, the recipient who
receives money based on a mistaken payment may be required
give it back to the rightful owner to prevent unjust enrichment
even though no wrongdoing is involved. On the other hand, if he
had stolen the money, he may have to not only return the money,
but also disgorge any gains he received because of his
wrongdoing.347
The victim is no longer constrained by
considering the value of what was taken, or by a two-unit
disparity analysis.348 And rightly so. Certainly, as between the
thief and the victim, it is more unjust for the thief to keep any
gains resulting from the victim’s property than it is for the
victim to get a recovery that exceeds the technical value of his
loss. The choice of measure “is dictated by general principles of
unjust enrichment, turning chiefly on the innocence or
blameworthiness of the defendant.”349 The amount of restitution
required thus depends on the degree of wrongdoing and other
factors, but the right to restitution requires only unjust
enrichment. The Restatement of Restitution recognizes this
nuanced approach in the context of failed contracts.350 For
example, a court may, in allowing restitution following a failed
contract, focus on restoring the prior position of one party more
than the other.351 Where one party is more at fault, the focus
will be on insuring that the more “innocent” party is effectively
returned to the status quo, even at the expense of the one more

object of a disgorgement remedy are not required in dealing either with
innocent recipients or with inadvertent tortfeasors . . . .”).
347. “When the plaintiff is entitled to ‘waive the tort’ and sue for
restitution in a case of converted chattels, the normal measure of recovery is
the benefit received by the defendant, not the loss to the plaintiff.” DOBBS,
supra note 108, § 5.18(2), at 928.
348. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §344 cmt. d (AM.
LAW INST. 1981) with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
349. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 49
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
350. Id. § 31 cmt. a (“The restitution claims asserted by performing
parties in such cases are classified by this Restatement according to the nature
of the transactional defect.”).
351. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 108, § 11.5 at 737 (discussing various
approaches, varying with the context, for measuring restitution in mistake
cases).
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at fault.352 In other words, fault may be an important factor in
measuring the recovery,353 but it is not required for granting a
recovery in the first instance.
In denying any restitution to the non-breaching party, the
Restatement of Restitution essentially skips a step, providing no
restitution to most plaintiffs who enrich the breaching party,
effectively penalizing them for innocently making bad bargains.
On the other hand, it may provide super-restitution to some
plaintiffs, effectively penalizing the breaching party. The
resulting penalty is not necessarily because of wrongdoing.
Potentially it could result from reasonable business decisions.
The section requires that the breach be “deliberate,” that it
result in “profit to the defaulting promisor,” and that “the
available damage remedy afford[] inadequate protection to the
promisee’s contractual entitlement,”354 none of which
necessarily involve wrongdoing. And there is no middle ground
for recognizing that restitution decisions are often nuanced and
case specific.
If the focus remains on restitution, the results are more
coherent. Restitution based on unjust enrichment will be
granted or denied based on applying unjust enrichment
principles in context. The risks accepted in the contract will be
considered, and may weigh against restitution.355 However,
because the non-breaching party did not agree to, in the event of
a breach, enrich the breaching party at his own expense, he
352. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 54(3)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“Rescission is limited to cases in which
counter-restitution by the claimant will restore the defendant to the status quo
ante, unless . . . (b) the fault of the defendant or the assignment of risks in the
underlying transaction makes it equitable that the defendant bear any
uncompensated loss.”). See also, id. § 54 cmt. i (this concern for the more
innocent party may in fact result in the recovery of “what are commonly called
‘incidental damages’ . . . in connection with rescission, consistent with the
remedial objective of restoring the claimant to the precontractual position”).
353. Id. pt. III, ch. 7, topic 1, introductory note (“Unlike the assessment
of compensatory damages – to which the defendant’s relative culpability is
usually irrelevant – it will be seen that the measurement of unjust enrichment
frequently turns on a judgment about the defendant’s degree of fault.”).
354. Id. § 39(1).
355. See DOBBS, supra note 108, § 4.5(1), at 629 (measurement should
“reflect the substantive law purpose that calls for restitution in the first place”)
(citing Murdock-Bryant Const., Inc. v. Pearson, 703 P.2d 1197, 1204 (Ariz.
1985).
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should not be precluded from receiving restitution just because
he does not meet the high standards for opportunistic breach.
The Restatement itself acknowledges that the “tradition from
which we receive the modern law of restitution authorizes a
court to remedy unjust enrichment where it finds it . . . .”356
When disgorgement is sought, granting the remedy must
require more than a profitable breach of contract. The stated
reason for disgorgement in the case of opportunistic breach is
deterrence,357 which is inconsistent with contract law. Thus, if
disgorgement is to be the measure, it must be justified under
restitution principles, not granted as a penalty for a profitable
breach. Such an approach avoids the very difficult problem of
defining and cabining opportunistic breach358 by focusing on
restitution principles to support any potential disgorgement.
An example illustrates the potential problem with the allor-nothing approach. Assume Contractor (C) is hired by a
homeowner (O) to demolish his old house and build a new one on
the same lot. There is one price for the job (the contract is
entire).359 After the contract is entered, the cost of lumber rises
sharply. Of course, contract law says too bad for C. He accepted
the risk. At this point he has no good options. He can perform
as agreed, losing money, or breach the contract, also losing
money. If he breaches, O’s damages will, of course, be based on
the market value of the unfulfilled performance, which at this
point is high in relation to the bargained compensation. Either
way, his unfortunate bargain will cost him. Let us assume that
he decides to proceed, hoping he can find ways to limit costs as
much as possible to avoid paying damages based on the much
higher prices a new contractor will likely charge. The first order
of business is the demolition. He tears down the house, clears
356. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011). The quote goes on to state that not every injustice
qualifies as unjust enrichment. However, that statement does not diminish
the force of the premise as to those enrichments that are unjust and deserving
of compensation.
357. See id. § 39 cmt. b (“Restitution (through the disgorgement remedy)
seeks to . . . reduc[e] the likelihood that the conscious disregard of another’s
entitlement can be more advantageous than its negotiated acquisition.”).
358. See supra notes 314-15 and accompanying text.
359. A contract for the construction of a single structure is generally
considered entire, not divisible. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 240 cmt. e, illus. 7 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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the land and prepares to build the house. O then gets a very
attractive offer from a developer to buy the property. O
determines that it makes more economic sense to sell and to buy
another, more desirable, property with his unexpected profit. He
fires C and sells the land. C sues for breach of contract. He will
not seek expectation damages because his contract was a losing
contract. He could sue for reliance damages, but if his projected
losses exceed the amount of money spent on the demolition, he
will recover nothing.
The question at this point is whether we are to consider the
breach “opportunistic.”
If we do not, then under the
Restatement he is not entitled to restitution.360 Under section
38, he can sue for the market value of the demolition, but it, of
course, will be diminished by the proportionate loss on the
contract.361 Yet in the example, O, the breaching party, gets a
windfall. He gets, and will use, all of the benefit of the work
done, paying a fraction of its worth, and at the expense of the
non-breaching party. In fact, the ability to breach the contract
without paying full value for the work done may well have
encouraged him to breach. In this case, the limitation on his
recovery is unwarranted.
On the other hand, maybe we could call O opportunistic, and
make him disgorge his profits to C. But now we have created
the opposite effect. C gets a windfall,362 and O loses all the
benefit of dealing with his own property. Why not just make him
pay C for the value of the work done? Is O really a bad actor?
Does contract law not allow him to breach and move on? Should
it not? If he knew he would have to pay C in restitution, he
would make his calculation accordingly: If the new deal is still
beneficial while paying restitution to C, he will likely take it. If
not, he will not. If he is going to give up all his profits, he will
likely forego the new opportunity. Thus, C will have to continue
to perform at a loss, O will lose the opportunity to make more

360. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). See also id. § 2(2), § 44
cmt. a.
361. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 38(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
362. The windfall to C is inconsistent with the Restatement’s generally
unforgiving attitude toward to parties who make unprofitable agreements.
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money and buy a property that pleases him more, and the
developer will lose an opportunity that was apparently going to
be beneficial to him.363 Granted, this result will not occur if we
do not consider the breach opportunistic, but that just leads us
back to the original unsatisfactory result in which the contractor
is not adequately compensated for a breach that the new
Restatement rule may have encouraged.
Application of restitution principles produces more
satisfactory results. C is paid for his work by O, who received
the benefit. If it is determined that O is actually a “bad actor,”
perhaps restitution principles will require a disgorgement of
profits.364 But a “deliberate breach of contract result[ing] in
profit”365 would not in itself label him a bad actor. The
disgorgement of profits would enhance a claim only where
disgorgement is justified under restitution principles. Such
principles would not provide disgorgement simply because the
breaching party benefits from the breach. No new free-standing
claim in contract should risk the same result.
D. A Final Example
A final example from the Restatement illustrates how the
new approach can deprive the plaintiff of a legitimate claim, and
how retaining a restitution option serves contracts principles,
restitution principles, and justice. The example can be found in
illustration 15 to section 38:
A works for five years as manager of B’s business,
in exchange for a nominal salary and an option to
purchase the business at the end of the period on
stated terms. When the time comes, A tenders the
option price but B repudiates the agreement and
sells the business to a third party. A can prove
that the market value of his services during the
363. This characterization of course sounds like classic efficient breach
theory, which, while criticized, remains an important underpinning in contract
law. See supra notes 310-12 and accompanying text.
364. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 3
(AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“A person is not permitted to profit by his own wrong.”).
365. Id. § 39.
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five-year period exceeded his aggregate salary by
$500,000. On the other hand, B can prove that the
value of A’s option (the value of the business less
the option price) was $300,000 at most. A is
entitled to damages by the rule of §38(2)(b), but
A’s recovery is limited to $300,000. (On these
facts, A’s expectation and performance-based
damages are identical).366
The parenthetical at the end of the illustration is most telling.
It emphasizes that the Restatement approach is a damage
measure and leaves the plaintiff without a restitution option.
With the facts given, the illustration appears to be a losing
contract. A may have made a bad bargain. Under the
expectation measure, he will live with that bad bargain.367 He
will likewise live with it under the reliance measure, because he
would have to subtract the losses, putting him in the same
position.368 However, if we were to protect his restitution
interest, he should be in a better position.
Restitution is designed to prevent unjust enrichment. Thus,
we must examine the facts to find both the enrichment, and the
injustice of allowing B to retain it without compensating A. The
enrichment is easy. B has received a $500,000 benefit from A.369
But for the contract with A, he would have had to pay someone
the going rate to manage his business—in other words, another
$500,000. The question then is whether it is unjust for B to
retain this benefit without compensating A. I submit that it is,
and that A should recover the $500,000 in restitution.
Importantly, the illustration does not involve a plaintiff
trying to sue for more than the total amount of the contract. If
A had agreed to work for five years for $500,000 total, and B
366. Id. § 38 cmt. c, illus. 15.
367. The expectation interest is “intended to give [the plaintiff] the
benefit of his bargain by . . . put[ting] him in as good a position as he would
have been in had the contract been performed.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.1981) (emphasis added).
368. Id. § 349.
369. This benefit is of course in the form of a “saved expenditure,” but as
the Restatement acknowledges, a “saved expenditure . . . is no less beneficial
to the recipient than a direct transfer.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
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fired him without justification some time before the five-year
period, it makes sense that A’s claim for any unpaid work cannot
be for more than $500,000 no matter how much the work he has
done is actually “worth.” That is the contract price limitation
with which I agree. In the variation, we know what value the
parties placed on the work based on their contract. But in the
original illustration, we do not have that information. We know
the value the market, and thus the court, placed on the
performance, but that is not the same as saying we know what
the value was to the parties. And not knowing that value,
arguments about windfalls, exceeding the contract value, or
relying on the valuation made by the parties, falter.
From a restitution perspective, it appears A has a good
argument for the entire $500,000. Having established B’s
enrichment, let us consider A’s position. Why would A enter into
such a contract? It appears that A wants to own his own
business—to be his own boss. Presumably he could have simply
started a business from nothing. Had he done so, it is highly
likely that he would have worked for an effectively low rate in
the early stages while the business is being established. He
would realize this, but would be willing to do so to reach his goal
of owning his own business—something he may value very
highly. The benefits of the type of arrangement he had with B
(avoiding large start-up costs, less risk) are clear, but the goal,
and the need to sacrifice to reach that goal, is much the same.
So what is A’s situation now? He has spent five years
working at a below-market rate to reach his goal of owning his
own business. Yet he does not own his own business. I suppose
he could buy another business now at the market rate, but that
business would not be the one he has had several years to learn
and to shape. Or he could find someone else to make a similar
deal with him, and invest another five years of his life, hoping
this new party does not breach the new contract. But under
either of those options, it would have been much better for him
to have earned the going rate for his services for the previous
five years and now have $500,000 instead of $300,000 to use to
embark on his new endeavor. Yet that opportunity has been lost
to him because of B’s conduct. And it has in fact been much
better for B, who received the benefit of A’s work without paying
the going rate. In other words, B has been enriched at A’s
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expense, creating a two-unit disparity. A rule that prevents A
from suing for the benefit conferred on B seems unjustified.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Restatement of Restitution, in the three sections
dealing with “Alternative Remedies for Breach of an Enforceable
Contract,” for the most part disallows restitution based in unjust
enrichment for a non-breaching party to a contract.370 The
determination to eliminate the unjust enrichment option,
treating breach of contract claimants as uniquely undeserving of
restitution, seems to drive much of the structure of the section.
Yet the Restatement creates a potentially punitive recovery for
some claimants, which is inconsistent with contract theory. The
approach also creates more confusion than clarification.
Further, its rejection of a restitution recovery for breach of
contract is not justified under either contract or restitution
principles. Importantly, the approach denies a recovery that
may be the best compensation for a deserving claimant. One
who has performed work under a valid contract that is ended
due to a total breach by the other party should not categorically
be denied the chance to receive compensation for the benefit
conferred on the breaching party. And the breaching party
should not, just because the benefit was conferred in a contract
context, be excused from paying for what he got.

370. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
pt. II, ch. 4, topic 2, intro. note 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). See also id. § 2(2), § 44
cmt. a.
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